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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a model of endogenous partial insurance and we investigate
its implications for macroeconomic outcomes, such as wealth inequality, asset accumula-
tion, interest rate, and consumption smoothing. To this end, we include participation costs
to state-contingent asset markets into an otherwise standard Aiyagari (1994) model. We
highlight the resulting non-monotonic relationship between wealth and insurance-market
participation when insurance is costly. Poor households remain uninsured, middle-class
households participate in the insurance market, while rich households decide to self-insure
by only purchasing risk-free assets. After theoretically characterizing the endogenous partial
equilibrium, we quantify its effect, emphasizing the roles of a participation channel and an
interest rate channel.
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1 Introduction
Recent papers have underscored important stylized facts about the heterogenous degree
of risk-sharing and consumption smoothing across US households: using PSID data Guvenen
(2007) documents that stockholders smooth less consumption than non-stockholders; similarly,
using CEX data Gervais and Klein (2010) find that households with larger financial assets
smooth consumption less than households with lower financial assets.1 These facts are at odds
with implications of a standard Aiyagari (1994) model, as the self-insurance channel is not
able to capture this observed heterogenous degree of insurance. This caveat couples with other
well-known issues of the conventional Aiyagari incomplete market model. First, this model fails
to deliver a strong amplification from income to wealth inequality when characterized only by
reasonably calibrated income shocks, as summarized in Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2014).2 Second,
standard incomplete market models imply a much larger amount of uninsurable lifetime income
risk for individuals than what is estimated in the data, as documented by Guvenen and Smith
(2014).
In this paper we first propose a tractable model that generates endogenous partial insurance
from a generalization of the standard Aiyagari model and, then, we show that: (i) it amplifies
the level of wealth inequality for a given income process with respect to the standard Aiyagari
model; (ii) it is able to potentially generate heterogenous degree of consumption smoothing
across the wealth distribution in line with the empirical findings of Guvenen (2007) and Gervais
and Klein (2010), depending on the assumed asset structure available to agents; and (iii) it
generates an aggregate level of insurance that is larger than in Aiyagari (1994) and is closer to
the value estimated in Guvenen and Smith (2014).
Our first contribution is to propose a simple model of endogenous partial insurance. In our
setting, markets that provide state contingent insurance do exist, but it is costly to access to
them. More precisely, in an otherwise standard general equilibrium economy as in Aiyagari
(1994), we introduce costs for participating in contingent asset markets.3 Consequently, house-
holds face a trade-off between paying the participation cost and enjoying the gain of consumption
smoothing. Conveniently, as two polar cases, our model nests a model with full participation,
in which the participation cost is so low that all agents optimally decide to provide insurance
to each other, and the standard incomplete market model as in Aiyagari (1994), in which the
cost is so high that all agents prefer to accumulate only risk-less assets as consumption buffer
1This result is robust to restricting the sample only to working age heads of the household persons, to excluding
households living in rural areas, and to excluding self-employed households.
2Many authors have extended these models to improve the ability to generate greater wealth inequality.
Among these approaches are the addition of special earning risks (Castaneda et al. (2003), Benhabib et al.
(2015)), entrepreneurial risks (Quadrini, 2000; Cagetti and De Nardi, 2009; Angeletos, 2007; Buera, 2009)),
bequest, human capital, and health risk (De Nardi (2004), Huggett (1996)), stochastic discounting (Krusell and
Smith (1998)), and capital income risk (Benhabib et al. (2011)).
3The idea that consumption smoothing is costly underpins our approach: being active in financial markets in-
volves monetary costs, broadly defined, such as fees and transactions costs charged by brokers and intermediaries,
costs related to information acquisition, and non-monetary costs, such as the opportunity cost of time devoted
to find the best portfolio allocation. See Section 6 for further discussion. See also Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)
for the role of fixed cost on capital accumulation and growth.
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and in that case our setting is equivalent to assuming that state-contingent assets do not ex-
ist. However, more generally, intermediate levels of participation costs deliver an endogenous
partial-insurance equilibrium, in which only a fraction of the population decides to insure. We
show that under very general conditions on the utility function the individual insurance deci-
sion is non-monotone across wealth: poor agents have too few resources to afford paying the
participation cost; middle class agents participate in the insurance markets; and richer agents
optimally decide only to self-insure as they have already a large quantity of wealth to use as
a buffer. This endogenous decision, which produces what we define as participation channel,
is able to generate consumption smoothing patterns consistent with the findings of Guvenen
(2007) and Gervais and Klein (2010).
To provide intuition on the endogenous insurance decision and on the participation channel,
we first investigate a simpler two-period two-states insurance model similar to the one in Kimball
(1990b). We are able to characterize the optimal asset decision conditional on participating or
not in the state contingent asset market. We are also able to separate the risk-free asset position
in a component that is driven by a consumption smoothing motive (i.e. by an expected future
income that is different from the current one) and by a precautionary saving motive (i.e. by
different possible realizations of future income). Consider agents that have an instantaneous
utility function that features decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). When access to the
insurance market is costly, agents endogenously decide whether to participate in the state-
contingent asset market depending on the level of their wealth. When wealth is large enough,
self insuring using only risk-free asset provides adequate insurance against undesired shocks;
hence, rich agents are better off by not participating in the insurance market because the cost of
paying the fixed cost is larger than the additional benefit brought by state contingent insurance.
For lower wealth levels, instead, paying the fixed cost to acquire state contingent assets is
optimal, as the gain of insurance exceeds the cost. Importantly, our analysis demonstrates
that the heterogeneity of insurance with respect to wealth is a quite general result because, as
discussed in Kimball (1990a), commonly used parameterizations of the utility function, such as
the constant relative risk aversion utility, display DARA.
We then incorporate the endogenous insurance decision into a standard neoclassical model
with idiosyncratic shocks as in Aiyagari (1994). As in the simpler model, we assume that two
types of assets are available in the economy: a set of state contingent assets, which can be
purchased only by paying a fixed participation cost, and a risk-free asset. Hence, agents first
decide whether they want to participate in the state contingent market, and, then, they decide
their optimal portfolio. Our first set of results are theoretical. Using a similar approach as in
Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018), we first show that the endogenous partial insurance model can be conveniently
written using a recursive formulation, and then we prove the existence of a recursive stationary
competitive equilibrium. In this setting, however, there is an additional potential source of
multiplicity of equilibria with respect to the standard Aiyagari (1994) model; in that model
multiplicity can arise because agents’ saving function may react in a non-monotonic way to
3
changes in the real interest rate, because of the opposite forces generated by the income and
substitution effects at an individual level. In the partial insurance model, the multiplicity of
equilibria can be also generated by the way endogenous participation feedbacks on asset prices
and by the mere presence of additional insurance.4
Our second contribution is to quantify the effects of the endogenous partial-insurance equi-
librium on aggregate inequality, asset prices, and degree of insurance. For this purpose, we
consider an income process that follows a seven-state Markov process, obtained by discretizing
an AR(1) process using Rouwenhorst (1995)’s method. The underlying process has a persistence
equal of 0.958, consistent with Kaplan (2012) and Fe`ve et al. (2017), and a standard deviation
of the innovations that is set to match the Gini index of post-tax income in the US of 0.40.
Then, we assume an asset structure such that even if agents participate in the state contingent
asset market, they are not fully insured. Therefore, part of the risk is exogenously not insurable,
while the other part is endogenously insurable. Under this assumption, no matter the level of
costs, all agents still have some incentive of accumulating wealth to self insure, although at
different degrees across the wealth distribution. This makes the distribution of wealth a smooth
function of the level of participation costs and, in this way, we are able to compare the equilib-
rium outcomes of the model for a large set of costs, from very high to zero. In the paper we
consider two types of asset structures: an asymmetric one, for which only some downward risk
is insurable, and a symmetric one, for which both upward and downward insurance is available
but only to a limited amount of agents; the comparison between these two structures high-
lights the contribution of different mechanisms of the model. We then compute the equilibrium
implications of the model as a function of the participation cost.
When the cost reduces from an arbitrary large level, for which the economy is identical to the
Aiyagari (1994) one, to zero we observe the following pattern: (i) not surprisingly participation
in the insurance market increases; (ii) the interest rate increases, as higher participation in the
insurance market leads to a lower overall demand for assets; (iii) inequality, measured by the
wealth Gini index, initially largely increases with participation, and then slightly declines for
smaller costs. There are two effects that rationalize this result. First, with endogenous partial
insurance middle-class households acquire insurance and, therefore, do not have incentive to
accumulate a lot of assets; on the contrary, richest households do not participate in the state
contingent asset market and have then a motive to accumulate assets. This participation channel
contributes to the thickening of the upper tail of the wealth distribution. Second, a general
equilibrium effect, for which higher insurance participation leads to lower asset demand and
higher interest rate, reinforces the skewness of the wealth distribution. We label this channel as
the interest rate channel : a higher interest rate penalizes non-insured poor households, which
mainly face upward risk and have incentive to dissave, while it benefits richer households as
they can enjoy higher returns from their financial wealth.
In the final part of the paper we continue the investigation of the properties of the endoge-
4If full insurance were available, absent any participation cost, the equilibrium would be dependent on the
assumed initial wealth distribution, as showed by Caselli and Ventura (2000).
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nous partial insurance model by analysing its implications for consumption smoothing, wealth
concentration, and marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. We focus particularly on how
a model of endogenous partial insurance differs from the Aiyagari (1994) model, highlighting
the roles of the participation channel and interest rate channel. It is of particular relevance
to consider an alternative asset structure in which few agents can insurance against upward
and downward risk. In this case the interest rate channel is almost completely muted, and
the equilibrium pattern of consumption smoothing across the wealth distribution is therefore
almost exclusively due to the participation channel ; as already discussed, the main outcome is
that poor agents do not smooth consumption much, middle class are the most insured agents,
while the richest have a lower degree of consumption smoothing compared to the middle class,
but, obviously, higher than the poor. Hence, we show that the participation channel in an
endogenous partial insurance model is able to generate consumption smoothing patterns across
the wealth distribution that are drastically different from a standard Aiyagari (1994) model and
more in line with the empirical evidence discussed in Guvenen (2007) and Gervais and Klein
(2010).
Related literature. In addition to the papers that we have already mentioned, our work
expands on several bodies of the literature.
Among the empirical studies conducted on lack of insurance and consumption smoothing as
Townsend (1994) and Mace (1991), our work bears similarity to that of Cochrane (1991), and,
more recently, Grande and Ventura (2002), who study households’ insurance against different
types of risk. They show that households are well insured against certain types of risks, such
as health problems, but not against other types of risks, such as unemployment (especially
involuntary job loss) (see also Blundell et al., 2008).
Our work also relates to the literature linking models of incomplete insurance with empiri-
cal evidence as in Broer (2013), who compares the empirical predictions of different incomplete
market models with the empirical joint distribution of consumption, income, and wealth; and
Krueger and Perri (2005, 2006) or Kaplan and Violante (2010), who assess the degree of in-
surance beyond self-insurance. In our setting the participation cost modifies the link between
income and consumption inequality, through the resulting non-monotone degree of insurance
across wealth. Hence, trends in one of these variables are imperfectly transmitted to the other,
consistently with the findings in Attanasio et al. (2012) and Aguiar and Bils (2015). The idea
to include participation costs to access financial markets has been also investigated by Guvenen
(2007) but in a contest with aggregate shocks and with focus on risk sharing among stock-
holders. On another note our paper is also connected to the paper on global imbalances by
Mendoza et al. (2009), where imperfect insurance results from the imperfect verifiability of the
income realization. In our case, imperfect insurance results from the endogenous decision not
to participate in (potentially imperfect) insurance markets.
Finally, our work links to the literature in finance on limited participation as in Luttmer
(1999), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002a) and more recently in Paiella (2007a), Guvenen (2009) or
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Attanasio and Paiella (2011a) among others. In these models, the access to the stock market is
costly or open only in a subset of periods. Also, even when economists focus on limited asset
trading,5 they generally do not consider frictions related to asset market participation in their
models. In connection with this literature, Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) propose an
alternative story so as to why consumption may be more volatile for richer households: these
households are holding stocks and stockholders bear more aggregate risks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present a simple insurance model
in order to provide conditions and intuitions for households’ insurance decision. In Section 3 we
describe the general economic environment. Section 4 provides the theoretical results. Section 5
presents the quantitative findings about participation, wealth inequality, wealth concentration,
and consumption smoothing. Section 6 discusses a set of further extensions. Finally, Section 7
provides concluding remarks.
2 A Simple Insurance Model
In this section we present a simple two-period two-state model of endogenous partial insur-
ance, which highlights how participation in the insurance market relates to wealth.
The economy lasts two periods, t = 0, 1. The household starts period t = 0 with some
endowed level of wealthW , or cash-in-hands. In period t = 1 the household receives some income
that consists of a deterministic component and a stochastic component. The deterministic
component is denoted with y. With probability p, the agent has a negative income shock, −L,
where L ≥ 0; with probability 1−p, the household receives a positive income shock, pL/(1−p).
We assume that y < W so that the expected level of income is lower than the period-0 cash-in-
hands. Also notice, that in expectation the income received is exactly equal to y. We denote
with the indicator variable 1L the realization of the state of nature, so that 1L = 1 if the negative
income shocks realize, and 1L = 0 otherwise. The household maximizes the following expected
utility function: E0 (u(c0) + u(c1)), where E0 denotes the expectation operator conditional on
information available at time 0, and u(·) is the instantaneous utility function. For simplicity,
we assume that there is no discounting.
We introduce an endogenous decision of participating in the insurance market in the model.
There are two assets available to the agent. At time t = 0, the agent can acquire b units of
risk-free assets at unit price qb; this asset repays a unit of consumption at time t = 1, regardless
the realization of the shock. Also, the agent can acquire a units of a state-contingent asset at
unit price qa; this asset repays a unit of consumption good at time t = 1 only if the loss in
wealth occurs, i.e. if 1L = 1. Importantly, in order to have access to this state contingent asset,
the agent needs to pay a fixed cost κ. The household is not necessarily willing to pay the fixed
cost and, hence, we define as δ(W,κ) the choice variable that denotes contingent asset market
5This can happen because of lack of commitment (Thomas and Worrall, 1988; Kocherlakota, 1996), trading
technologies (Chien et al., 2011) or because of ad hoc assumptions as in the incomplete market literature.
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participation, given a level of wealth and a participation cost: if the household pays the cost and
purchases contingent assets, δ(W,κ) equals 1. Otherwise, it equals 0. Since we are interested in
the decision of an individual agent that takes prices as given, we now assume that asset prices
are actuarially fair, that is qa = p and qb = 1.
Let us first derive the problem of an agent that participates in the state contingent asset
market, that is when δ(W,κ) = 1. In this case, the budget constraints are:
c0 + pa+ b+ κ = W,
c1 = y + 1L(a− L) + (1− 1L) pL
1− p + b.
FOCs for a and b give:
u′(W − pa− b− κ) = u′(y + a− L+ b), (1)
u′(W − pa− b− κ) = pu′(y + a− L+ b) + (1− p)u′
(
y + b+
pL
1− p
)
. (2)
Combining (1) and (2) we obtain that the optimal contingent asset position in case of
participation, denoted with a superscript P , is: aP = L1−p , and b
P = W−y2 − pL1−p − κ2 .
The portfolio decision of the insured household reveals interesting insights. First, since the
state contingent asset insures against downward risk, the agent optimally chooses a positive
amount of state contingent assets. Second, the portfolio decision for the risk-free asset incor-
porates two motives: the first motive is included in the term W−y2 and corresponds to the
consumption smoothing incentive; when expected future income is lower than current cash in
hands, y < W , the agent would like to save to transfer intertemporally consumption. Impor-
tantly, this saving motive is present even when there is no uncertainty on future income, that
is when L = 0. The second motive is included in the term − pL1−p − κ2 , and corresponds to the
insurance motive. Since the agent has a long position in the state-contingent asset, she has to
reduce her risk-free asset position in order to achieve perfect insurance and to smooth the cost
of insurance across the two periods. Notice that this insurance motive is present even when
expected future income is equal to current cash in hands, that is when y = W .
Under the optimal portfolio choice, the agent is able to equate consumption across time and
states, and c0 = c1 =
W+y
2 − κ2 .
The indirect utility of participating is then:
V P (W,κ) = 2u
(
W + y
2
− κ
2
)
.
Let us now derive the problem of an agent that does not participate in the state contingent
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asset market, that is when δ(W,κ) = 0. In this case, the budget constraints are:
c0 + b = W,
c1 = y + 1L(−L) + (1− 1L) pL
1− p + b.
FOC for b gives:
u′(W − b) = pu′(y − L+ b) + (1− p)u′
(
y +
pL
1− p + b
)
(3)
This expression implicitly determines the optimal level of the risk-free asset holding in case
of non-participation in the state contingent asset market, bN (W ). We hereby assume, as in
Kimball (1990a), that the agent is at such an interior solution. This condition implies a lower
bound for the level of wealth, which we denote as W . We label as feasible the values of wealth
such that W ≥W .
We can characterize optimal asset holdings with the following result.
Proposition 1. Let u(x) be a three-times continuously differentiable utility function, such that
u′(x) > 0, u′′(x) < 0, u′′′(x) > 0 and satisfies the Inada conditions: lim
x→∞u
′(x) = 0, and
lim
x→0
u′(x) =∞. Then, for any feasible level of wealth, i.e. ∀W ≥W :
1. bN (W ) ≥ W−y2 , with bN (W ) = W−y2 ⇐⇒ L = 0. Also, limW→∞b
N (W ) =∞.
2. ∂b
N (W )
∂W > 0 and if L = 0 =⇒ ∂b
N (W )
∂W =
1
2 . Also, limW→∞
∂bN (W )
∂W =
1
2 . Hence, 0 <
∂bN (W )
∂W ≤
1
2 .
3. In addition:
(a) ∂b
N (W )
∂W =
1
2 , ∀W , if the utility u(·) displays Constant Absolute Relative Risk Aversion
(CARA), i.e. u′′(W ) = −zu′(W ), with z contant.
(b) Otherwise ∂b
N (W )
∂W <
1
2 , ∀W finite.
Proof. See Appendix A.2 for the proof.
Proposition 1 displays the optimal behavior for savings when state contingent asset markets
are not available. The first result states that saving do, in general, play a dual role: they
guarantee consumption smoothing, so that they are at least weakly greater than W−y2 , and they
contribute to insurance through a precautionary saving motive. This motive explains the gap
between bN (W ) and W−y2 . In addition, the proposition highlights two additional important
results. First, precautionary saving incentives either move proportionally with wealth or they
weaken with wealth. The latter case occurs when the utility function displays Decreasing
Absolute Risk Aversion.
We can now compute the indirect utility of non-participating, which is:
V N (W ) = u
(
W − bN (W ))+ pu(y − L+ bN (W )) + (1− p)u(y + bN (W ) + pL
1− p
)
,
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with bN (W ) implicitly defined by condition (3).
2.1 Gain of Insurance
Let P(κ) be the set of feasible wealth levels for which participation in the insurance market
is optimal for a given participation cost κ. Formally:
Definition 1. (Participation Set). For a given participation cost κ, for any wealth level in P(κ)
insurance market participation is optimal, that is:
P(κ) =
{
W ∈ [W,∞) : V P (W,κ) > V N (W )} .
Let define the gain of insurance as G(W,κ) = 12
(
V P (W,κ)− V N (W )). It can be rewritten
as:
G(W,κ) = u
(
W + Y
2
− κ
2
)
− 1
2
u(W − bN )− p
2
u
(
y + bN − L)− 1− p
2
u
(
y + bN +
pL
1− p
)
.
(4)
We now restrict our analysis to the case in which L > 0, which means that the agent is
subject to some income risk. The first set of results concerns the frictionless economy with no
costs.
Proposition 2. (Insurance Incentives without cost) Let u(x) be a three-times continuously
differentiable utility function, such that u′(x) > 0, u′′(x) < 0, u′′′(x) > 0, and satisfies the
Inada conditions: lim
x→∞u
′(x) = 0, and lim
x→0
u′(x) =∞. Then, for any feasible level of wealth, i.e.
∀W ≥W :
1. G(W, 0) > 0 ;
2. ∂G(W,0)∂W < 0 .
3. lim
W→∞
G(W, 0) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2 for the proof.
Proposition 2 shows that, absent any cost, κ = 0, the agent is always better off by partici-
pating in the state contingent asset market, since in this case she can obtain full insurance. In
addition, the gain of insurance declines with wealth. The intuition stems from the fact that,
when wealth increases, the self-insurance mechanism through precautionary saving using only
risk-free assets provides better and better insurance. This result applies to any utility function
that is increasing, concave, and whose marginal utility is convex, i.e. u′′′(·) > 0. This condition
means that the utility function displays prudence, As discussed in Kimball (1990a), prudence
measures the strength of the precautionary saving motive, which induces individuals to prepare
and forearm themselves against uncertainty they cannot avoid- in contrast to risk aversion,
which is how much agents dislike uncertainty and want to avoid it.
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We now consider the economy with participation costs.
Proposition 3. (Insurance Incentive with cost) Let u(x) be a three-times continuously differen-
tiable utility function, such that u′(x) > 0, u′′(x) < 0, u′′′(x) > 0, satisfies the Inada conditions:
lim
x→∞u
′(x) = 0, and lim
x→0
u′(x) = ∞, and features Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion. Then, for
any feasible level of wealth, i.e. ∀W > W :
1. (Existence of Thresholds). Let κˆ be the solution of G(W, κˆ) = 0. Then, ∀κ < κˆ, ∃!
W (κ) > W : W ∈ P(κ) ⇐⇒ W < W < W (κ).
2. (Comparative static of participation set)
• Participation set coincides with all feasible wealth levels when κ = 0, that is:
P(0) = {W : W > W} .
• Participation set is shrinking in participation cost, that is for all κ1 < κ2, if W ∈
P(κ2) then W ∈ P(κ1); hence, P(κ2) ⊂ P(κ1).
• Participation set is empty for any participation cost greater than κˆ, that is: ∀κ ≥ κˆ,
P(κ) = ∅.
Proof. See Appendix A.3 for the proof.
This proposition explains a crucial characteristic of the endogenous partial insurance model.
When accessing to the insurance market is costly, the agent endogenously decides whether to
participate in that state-contingent asset market depending on the level of its wealth. When
the wealth level is large enough, W > W (κ), the agent is better off by not-participating in the
insurance market since the cost of paying the fixed cost is larger than the expected benefit of
reducing the loss in case of occurrence of the negative shock. For those wealth levels, in fact,
G(W,κ) < 0. This feature of the model with participation cost is displayed in Figure 1, which
plots the gain of insurance for an economy with no participation costs (blue solid line) and with
a positive participation cost (red dashed line). The shaded area displays the participation set.
In addition, Proposition 1 states that when the cost tends to zero, the participation set
corresponds to the entire feasible wealth domain. On the contrary, the participation region
disappears when the cost is larger than a certain threshold κˆ. In this case entering in the
insurance market is either infeasible or not beneficial. The necessary condition for the existence
of the threshold wealth level is that the utility function features Decreasing Absolute Risk
Aversion. Under this assumption, at lower levels of wealth self-insurance does not provide
enough insurance and in this case the benefit of full insurance is worth paying the participation
cost. On the contrary, for larger levels of wealth, self-insurance is a good enough insurance
mechanism and the extra gains for participating in the state-contingent asset markets are not
worth paying the participation cost.
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Figure 1 – Gain of Insurance
Note: This graph plots the gain of insurance for an economy with no participation costs (blue solid line) and
with a positive participation cost (red dashed line). W is the threshold level of wealth for which any agent
with wealth lower than that value pays the cost and participates in the contingent asset market and any agent
with wealth higher than that value only acquires risk free assets. The shaded area denotes this insurance
participation region. We assume a CRRA utility function with risk aversion parameter equal to 2, a loss L
equal to 0.3 associated to a probability, p, equal to 0.25, and a participation cost equal to κ = 0.05.
3 A Model of Endogenous Partial Insurance
In this section we describe the general economic environment. We consider an infinite horizon
production economy populated by a continuum of mass 1 of ex ante homogenous households.
This model follows closely Aiyagari (1994) except for two dimensions: we introduce securities
contingent to idiosyncratic states and we simultaneously introduce fixed participation costs for
each contingent market. Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, ...}.
Uncertainty and preferences. Each household chooses consumption so as to maximize
the following utility: U = Et
∑
t
∑
yt β
tu
(
c(yt)
)
, where Et denotes the expectation operator
conditional on information available at time t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, yt denotes
the history of labor income exogenous realizations, c(yt) denotes consumption at date t and
u is a strictly increasing and concave function. We assume that u is three times continuously
differentiable.
Households inelastically provide labor. At every period they receive a stochastic labor
endowment, yt. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, this assumption is equivalent to con-
sidering that households receive a stochastic good-endowment y˜t = wtyt, where wt is the wage
rate.
We assume that yt follows a Markov process, which takes values in Y = {y1, ...yN} and
that pi(yj |yk) is the associated transition probability from state k to state j. N , thus, denote
the number of states of the income process. We denote by yt the history of the realizations of
the shock, yt = {y0, y1, ..., yt}, and by Π(yk) the fraction of households in state k. Total labor
endowment is constant and it is the combination of labor provided by households with different
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labor shocks, yt = yk, for k = 1, .., N , i.e.:
L¯ =
∑
yt∈Y
Π(yt)yt.
Asset structure. To smooth consumption, households may trade a set of different assets.
First, households can purchase non-contingent bonds. Each of these bonds yields, uncon-
ditionally, one unit of goods next period. Let B(yt) denote the household’s position in the
risk-free assets and by qft its price. Besides, as in Aiyagari (1994), we impose that this position
is bounded below: B(yt) ≥ −B where B ≥ 0 is finite.6
Second, households can trade contingent assets. Let A ⊂ Y ×Y denote the combinations of
current and next period income realizations for which contingent assets are available. For each
yt ∈ Y , this also defines a set A(yt) of next period states for which households in state yt can
buy contingent assets; the assets available in a given state yt pay off one unit of consumption
good next period only contingently to a specific realization of yt+1. Therefore, the dimension
of A(yt) indicates also the number of state contingent assets available to an agent with current
income yt. We can then index state contingent assets by (yt+1|yt). Let q(yt+1|yt) denote the
vector price of such assets, which is of the same dimension of A(yt), and let a(yt+1|yt) denote
the vector of asset holdings that insure against next period states, for a household with history
of shocks yt. Note that in our notation contingent asset holding depends on the current state
through the history of shock yt.
As for the risk-free asset, we assume the existence of ad-hoc constraints for the state con-
tingents assets, i.e. a(yt+1|yt) ≥ a¯, ∀yt+1 ∈ A(yt) and ∀yt, to rule out unbounded positions.
Notice that it is sufficient to define a¯ in the space A and that this generic formulation accounts
for the case in which constraints are different from asset to asset or in which they coincide with
natural limits. At this point there is no need to explicit what these constraints are.7
The novelty we introduce in this paper is that purchasing those assets requires paying a fixed
fee, κ. Hence, in order to hold any portfolio {a(yt+1|yt)}∀yt+1∈A(yt) of contingent assets, the
household has to pay
∑
yt+1∈A(yt) q(yt+1|yt)ᵀa(yt+1|yt) + κ, where the superscript ᵀ denotes the
transpose operator. Here, for simplicity, we assume that if the agent pays the participation cost
she can purchase or sell the preferred quantity of any state contingent asset. One can interpret
the cost κ as a generic function, which can incorporates different scenarios. For example, κ could
be a constant, could be a function of current income, with the interpretation that it denotes
the opportunity cost of time, it could be a function of the state that asset insures, etc...8 In
6We do not provide further foundations for that constraint. It can be exogenous debt limits as in Bewley
(1980), natural debt limits as in Aiyagari (1994) or endogenous borrowing constraints as in Zhang (1997) or
Abraham and Carceles-Poveda (2010) for such foundations.
7As an example, strict short sale constraints on state contingent assets could be rationalized by the existence
of competitive contracts between profit-maximizing financial intermediaries and agents that face idiosyncratic
income uncertainty, as in Krueger and Uhlig (2006). Finally, notice that the constraints for both the state
contingent assets and risk free asset can assume any general form; for example they can be state dependent. For
simplicity of notation we do not impose a specific form when presenting the model and we keep their respective
notation as a¯ and B¯, respectively.
8An alternative structure of cost would be to pay a fixed cost for purchasing each contingent asset. In this
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this section we do not need to specify the exact nature of the function. Finally, one can assume
that κ is a pure waste or that it represents pecuniary transaction costs charged by unmodeled
financial intermediaries that transform savings into productive capital.
The presence of the fixed cost implies that in each period the household needs to take a
discrete decision about whether to participate in the contingent asset market. We denote by
δ(yt) ∈ {0, 1} the corresponding decision variable, with the following meaning: when δ(yt) = 1,
a household with history yt decides to enter in the state-contingent asset market and when
δ(yt) = 0, it does not.
In the end, the proceeds of both contingent and risk-less assets are invested in physical
capital, whose returns are used to honour assets’ payments.
Remark. In the case in which the dimensions of A are M ×N , with M ≥ N −1, the set of state
contingent assets together with the risk free asset spans the whole space RN , since in each of
the N current state, M ≥ N − 1 linearly independent state contingent assets are available in
addition to the non-contingent asset. Notice that even in this case markets might not be still
complete if exogenous constraints on assets are stringent.
Given our setting, a household with a history of shock yt and a current shock realization yt
faces the following sequence of budget constraints:
c(yt) + qft B(y
t) + δ(yt)
 ∑
yt+1∈A(yt)
q(yt+1|yt)ᵀa(yt+1|yt) + κ
 = B(yt−1) + a(yt|yt−1) + wtyt.
Recall that in case of non-participation, δ(yt) = 0, the household is excluded from the contingent-
asset market, and, therefore, in that case a(yt+1|yt) = 0 for all yt+1 ∈ A(yt).
Production. As in Aiyagari (1994), we include production in our economy, creating an en-
dogenous net demand for capital. A single representative firm produces using a Cobb-Douglas
technology:
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t , (5)
where capital, Kt, and total labor, Lt, are rent from households. Production also implies
depreciation of capital at a rate χ. First order conditions for capital and labor are:
α
(
Kt
Lt
)α−1
= rt + χ, and (1− α)
(
Kt
Lt
)α
= wt,
and they determine capital demand, Kd and labor demand, Ld.
Market clearing condition. The asset market-clearing condition pins down aggregate cap-
ital, Kt+1; if the cost κ is assumed to represent transaction cost to financial intermediaries that
case, households’ decides in which state-contingent asset market to enter and, therefore, the participation decision
is a set of binary variables.
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convert savings and those costs into productive capital, the condition reads:
Kt+1 =
∑
yt
∑
yt+1∈A(yt)
[
q(yt+1|yt)ᵀa(yt+1|yt)δ(yt) + δ(yt)κ+ qft B(yt)
]
,
and the goods market-clearing condition pins down aggregate consumption, Ct, as:
Ct =
∑
yt
c(yt) = Yt −Kt+1 + (1− χ)Kt.
As agents are ex ante homogenous, the sum over all histories yt amounts to sum over all the
individuals.9
We now move to the definition and characterization of an equilibrium in this economy.
4 Endogenous partial insurance recursive equilibrium
In this section, we define a stationary competitive equilibrium for the endogenous partial
insurance model and we show that such an equilibrium exists, no matter the level of cost κ. To
this purpose, we first show that we can use standard recursive formulations and we then focus
on the definition of a recursive stationary competitive equilibrium. Finally, we also provide
some discussion of the potential multiplicity of equilibria and the predictive power of the model.
4.1 Recursive household problems
Let us start by investigating the household consumption-saving decisions in the presence
of the discrete decision to participate in the state contingent asset market. We first lay out
the sequential formulation of the problem, which naturally follows from the description of the
economy in Section 3. In this setting, the problem faced by households is complex: it integrates
a double maximization to decide about participation in the contingent asset market and about
asset purchases. Formally, this problem can be written as follows:
9If instead κ is pure waste the conditions becomes:
Kt+1 =
∑
yt
∑
yt+1∈A(yt)
[
q(yt+1|yt)ᵀa(yt+1|yt)δ(yt) + qft B(yt)
]
,
and
Ct +
∑
yt
δ(yt)κ =
∑
yt
[
c(yt) + δ(yt)κ
]
= Yt −Kt+1 + (1− χ)Kt.
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Problem 1 (Sequential formulation).
max
{δ(yt)}
max
{c(yt),B(yt),{a(yt+1|yt)}yt+1∈A(yt)}
∑
t
∑
yt
βtpi(yt)u(c(yt))
s.t. c(yt) + qft B(y
t) + δ(yt)
 ∑
yt+1∈A(yt)
q(yt+1|yt)ᵀa(yt+1|yt) + κ
 = wtyt +B(yt−1) + a(yt|yt−1),
B(yt) ≥ −B, and a(yt+1|yt) ≥ a¯ for all yt+1 ∈ A(yt),
a(yt+1|yt) = 0 for all yt+1 ∈ A(yt), if δ(yt) = 0.
As this problem is to difficult to deal with directly, we want to write it in a recursive form,
as in the standard in the literature (see Stokey et al., 1989, among many others). As it will
become clear later, we are interested in a stationary recursive equilibrium and therefore, in the
following, we threat prices as constant and we omit their dependence to the distributions for
convenience of notation. The recursive formulation of the problem is the following:
Problem 2. Given {w, q, qf},
V (B, {a(y)}, y) = max
δ∈{0,1}
{
V NP (B, {a(y)}, y), V P (B, {a(y)}, y)} , (6)
with
V NP (B, {a(y)}, y) = max
B′
u(c) + β∑
y′
pi(y′|y)V (B′, {a′(y′)}, y′)

s.t. c+ qfB′ ≤ wy +B + a(y),
B′ ≥ −B; a′(y′) = 0 ∀y′ ∈ A(y).
V P (B, {a(y)}, y) = max
{a′(y′)}y′∈A(y),B′
u(c) + β∑
y′
pi(y′|y)V (B′, {a′(y′)}, y′)

s.t. c+
 ∑
y′∈A(y)
q(y′|y)ᵀa′(y′) + κ
+ qfB′ ≤ wy +B + a(y),
B′ ≥ −B; a′(y′) ≥ a¯ ∀y′ ∈ A(y).
With this notation we emphasize that agents decide on a portfolio of Arrow securities,
denoted with {a′(y′)}. Notice that for convenience of notation we have omitted the dependence
of contingent asset holding, a′(y′), on current state y, since it is clearly a state variable of
the problem. Also, only the Arrow security associated with the realized state matters, and,
therefore, the state variable for the current value function is a(y). We denote the solution to
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this problem by {δ, {a′(y′)}, B′} = h(B, {a(y)}, y).
We make the following two assumptions on the utility function.
Assumption 1. The utility function u(c) satisfies: limc→0 u′(c) = −∞ and limc→∞ u′(c) = 0
Assumption 2. The utility function u(c) satisfies: lim infc→∞−u
′′(c)
u′(c) = 0.
Next, we make the following assumption on prices, as in Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018).
Assumption 3. The bond price qf and the wage rate w satisfy: w > 0; qf is finite; and β < qf .
We first show that under these assumptions, the state space is compact and the utility is
bounded.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the state space for the household’s problem
can be chosen to be compact, i.e. there is exist a finite B¯ > 0 and a finite vector a¯ > 0, such
that the optimal choice B′(B, a, y) < B¯ and a′(B, a, y) < a¯, for all y ∈ Y , for all B ≥ B¯, and
for all a ≥ a¯.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.4.
Compactness of the state space implies that the value function V : [B¯, B¯] × [a¯, a¯] × Y
is bounded below and above. We can then apply the standard fixed point argument to the
Bellman operator defined over continuous and bounded function. Proposition 11 in Appendix
A.5 proves that the value function in equation (6) satisfies the standard properties, which will
be used to prove the following result.
Proposition 5. For given {w, q, qf}, there exists a unique value function V : S → R and unique
policy functions δ : S → {0, 1}, B′ : S → R and, for all y and all y′ ∈ A(y), a′(y′) : S → R,
that solve Problem 2. This solution coincides with the solution to Problem 1.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.5.
Insurance decision A novelty of our paper is the presence of the insurance decision by
households. They choose δ by comparing the value of participating, V P , to the value of not
participating, V NP . When participating, agents purchase both contingent and non-contingent
assets but they also have to pay the fixed cost κ. In the end, their portfolio costs in a given
state y ∈ Y :  ∑
y′∈A(y)
q(y′|y)ᵀa′(y′) + κ
+ qfB′.
In exchange, agents have then a portfolio with state-contingent payoffs that, in our model,
provides them with more insurance. In contrast, when not participating, agents only purchase
non-contingent assets so that the cost of their portfolio is only qfB′ and its payoffs are non-
contingent.
Notice that this choice parallels the one we have presented in Section 2, Proposition 3: agents
decide to participate by trading off the gains of insurance with the cost of participation.
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4.2 Equilibrium definition
In this subsection, we introduce the definition of a stationary recursive equilibrium. To this
purpose, let us first note that agents are indexed by {B, {a}, y}, describing their asset positions
as well as their labor endowment. Let define S = Y ×A, where A is the set of households’ asset
positions. As this was clarified with Proposition 4, the sets for asset positions can be taken to
be compact. As it is standard in the literature, we can construct the aggregate law of motion.
Define by P(Y ) the power set of Y , and by B(A) the σ-algebra ofA. Let B(S) = P(Y )×B(A).
Finally, define byM the set of all probability measures on the measurable space M = (S,B(S)).
Let define the transition function Q : S × B(S)→ [0, 1] by:
Q ((B, {a}, y), (A,P(Y ))) =
∑
y′∈P(Y )
pi(y′|y) if (B′(B, {a}, y), {a′(B, {a}, y)}) ∈ A0 otherwise, (7)
for all (B, {a}, y) ∈ S, and all (A,P(Y )) ∈ B(S). Therefore Q ((B, {a}, y), (A,P(Y ))) is the
probability that an agent with current assets (B, {a}) and current income y ends up with assets
(B′, {a′}) in A tomorrow and income y′ ∈ P(Y ) tomorrow.
We can now define a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2. A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium consists of a set of prices (w, qf , q),
value function V : S → R, policy functions δ : S → {0, 1}, a′(y′) : S → Rdim(A) and B′ : S → R,
a probability measure Φ∗ such that:
1. V , δ, a′ and B′ are measurable with respect to B(S).
2. Given prices (w, qf , q), the value function V (B, {a}, y) and policy functions δ(B, {a}, y),
a′(B, {a}, y) and B′(B, {a}, y) solve the household problem.
3. Given prices (w, qf , q), the representative firm maximizes profits, i.e., capital demand Kd
and labor demand, Ld, satisfies: α
(
Kd
Ld
)α−1
= r, and (1−α)
(
Kd
Ld
)α
= w, with r = 1
qf
−1.
4. Prices (w, qf , q) clear the markets, i.e.
L¯ ≡
∑
y∈Y
Π(y)y = Ld
Ks ≡
∫ (
qᵀaδ + qfB + δκ
)
dΦ∗ = Kd.
5. The probability measure Φ∗ is invariant with respect to the transition function in equation
(7), i.e.: for all (A,P(Y )) ∈ B(S):
Φ∗(A,P(Y )) =
∫
Q ((B, {a}, y), (A,P(Y ))) dΦ∗.
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4.3 Conditions for existence
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium and we lay out conditions for its existence.
To establish some results, it is useful to define a stationary recursive equilibrium conditional on
insurance decision as follows:
Definition 3. Given a participation decision δ : S → {0, 1} and contingent asset a′(y′) : S →
Rdim(A), a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium conditional on insurance decision δ and
a′ is a set of prices (w, qf , q), value function V : S → R, a policy function B′ : S → R, a
probability measure Φ∗ such that:
1. V and B′ are measurable with respect to B(S).
2. Given prices (w, qf , q), and given the functions δ(B, {a}, y) and a′(B, {a}, y), the value
function V (B, {a}, y) and policy function B′(B, {a}, y) solve the household problem.
3. Prices (w, qf , q), value function V , the policy function B′(B, {a}, y), and probability mea-
sure Φ∗ satisfy conditions 3-5 in Definition 2.
This definition is useful to map the endogenous partial insurance equilibria to standard
Aiyagari economies. Based on this definition, we can establish the following result regarding
the existence of a stationary recursive equilibrium:
Lemma 6. A value function V : S → R, policy functions δ : S → {0, 1}, a′(y′) : S → Rdim(A)
and B′ : S → R, prices (w, qf , q), and a probability measure Φ∗ constitute a recursive stationary
equilibrium when:
(i) Given δ and a′, the value function V , policy function B′, prices (w, qf , q) and probability
measure Φ∗ constitute a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium conditional on an
insurance decision.
(ii) Given prices prices (w, qf , q), the value function V , policy functions a′, B′ and δ solve the
household recursive problem.
As a result, finding a stationary recursive equilibrium amounts to find a stationary recursive
competitive equilibrium conditional on a insurance decision and then check that this insurance
decision is indeed optimal given the other policy functions and the prices resulting from this
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium conditional on an insurance decision.
Our first result is about the existence of stationary recursive competitive equilibria condi-
tional on an insurance decision:
Proposition 7. When the dimension of A < N−1, for every participation decision δ : S → R,
there exists at least one stationary recursive equilibrium conditional on an insurance decision δ
and a′.
In any of such equilibrium, the price of the non-contingent asset satisfies qf > β and the
prices of contingent assets satisfy, for any y ∈ Y and any y′ ∈ A(y), q(y′|y) = qfpi(y′|y).
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Proof. See Appendix A.6 for the proof.
The core of the proof relies on the existence result by Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018) for Aiyagari economies
with production. To be able to use this result, we first define a modified income process,
resulting from the state contingent asset market participation decision as described in the proof
of Proposition 5. We also need that the set of assets cannot allow for full insurance. Under this
assumption, the existence of an equilibrium is not a difficult problem.
For a participation cost κ, a stationary recursive equilibrium requires finding a participation
decision that: (i) is optimal given the participation cost and the level of prices (w, qf , q); and (ii)
leads to a stationary recursive equilibrium given an insurance decision in which the resulting
levels of prices are (w, qf , q). More formally, Proposition 7 leads to a function (w, qf , q) =
f(δ, a′) and the optimal portfolio decision to a function {δ, a′} = g((w, qf , q), κ) for which
(w, qf , q) are the equilibrium level of prices that are also the fixed point of the following function:
φκ(w, q
f , q)) = f(g((w, qf , q), κ)) = (w, qf , q).
Since δ is a discrete variable, we cannot use standard results as the intermediary value
theorem or even the more general Kakutani theorem due to lack of continuity. In practice, we
obtain such a continuity because the set of points where δ is potentially discontinuous with
respect to prices (w, qf , q) is finite and because, in equilibrium, marginal variations in prices
generically do not lead to changes in δ for relevant income and asset levels. This ensures that
φκ(w, q
f , q) has a closed graph and allows for the use of general results on existence.
Multiplicity of equilibria Let us comment more on the set of equilibria: for a given cost κ,
there might be multiple equilibria.10
When participation costs are sufficiently high to make insurance never affordable, the econ-
omy coincides with an Aiyagari economy and it is known that in that case the equilibrium is not
necessarily unique. Light (2017) shows the uniqueness for Aiyagari economies with CRRA pref-
erences, but only with relative risk aversion lower than 1. In contrast, Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018) provides
example where the Aiyagari economy is compatible with multiple equilibria when preferences
are CRRA with a relative risk aversion coefficient greater than 1.11
When adding participation decisions to insurance markets, we add a potential other source
of multiplicity through a feedback between participation decisions and asset prices. Whereas
marginal variations of asset prices might lead participation decisions not to change, large varia-
tions could well shift participation decisions and lead to another equilibria. More specifically, on
the one hand, participation decisions depend on the prevailing interest rate and in particular,
if the cost of self-insurance is higher (due to lower risk-free rate or higher price qf for non-
contingent assets), participation to insurance markets may become more attractive. On the
other hand, more participation modifies households’ savings and thus may reduce the interest
rate.
10Of course, there are multiple equilibria for different participation costs as we will illustrate in Section 5.
11As Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018) points out, this does not necessarily mean that the Aiyagari model loses its predictive
power in this case, as standard calibration procedures usually lead to a single equilibrium.
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The mere possibility to have more insurance also contributes to the multiplicity of equilibria.
In particular, it is well known that, in the extreme case where the set of contingent assets
and borrowing constraints allow for complete markets, the stationary wealth distribution is a
function of the initial conditions and, in particular of the initial wealth distribution as pointed
out by Caselli and Ventura (2000).
Insurance as a function of participation Finally, let us note that equilibria are quite
different with respect to the value of participation costs.
In the case where participation costs are sufficiently high, there is no participation for any
level of wealth and income, that is, for all (B, {a}, y) ∈ S, δ(B, {a}, y) = 0. This happens
regardless the price of the asset qf . The economy coincides then with the standard Aiyagari
economy, in which agents smooth consumption only by using non-contingent assets.
In the other extreme case where costs are zero, agents always participate in the available
state contingent asset market, that is for all (B, {a}, y) ∈ S such that A(y) 6= ∅, δ(B, {a}, y) = 1.
In this case, the insurance structure is only limited by the exogenous asset structure A.
For intermediate levels of costs, endogenous partial insurance may arise as an equilibrium
outcome, that is δ(B, {a}, y) may be equal to 0 for some (B, {a}, y) ∈ S even when A(y) 6= ∅
and, for some other (B, {a}, y) ∈ S, δ(B, {a}, y) = 1.
5 Quantitative Implications of Endogenous Partial Insurance
In this section we present the quantitative implications of the endogenous partial insurance
model, with a particular focus on highlighting the strength of the main mechanisms of the
model.
5.1 Calibration
5.1.1 Preferences, Technology, and Income Process
The functional form and parameters for the utility function and production function are
standard. The utility function is assumed to be CRRA, i.e. u(c) = c1−σ/(1 − σ), with σ = 2.
The discount factor is set at β = 0.96. Regarding the production technology, the share of capital
in the production function is fixed at α = 0.36 and the depreciation rate at 0.08.
We discretize the income process by mapping a first order autoregressive process into a first
order Markov process with seven states, using Rouwenhorst’s method, as assumed in Krueger
et al. (2016) for modelling the evolution of income conditional on employment.12 There are,
then, two key parameters: the persistence of the income process, and the standard devia-
tion of its innovations. Following Kaplan (2012) and Fe`ve et al. (2017), we assume that the
persistence of income is 0.958. We then adjust the standard deviation of the innovations so
that the process generates an income Gini index equal to the one observed in the post-taxed
12See Kopecky and Suen (2010) for a detailed description and evaluation of the Rouwenhorst method.
20
U.S. income data, that is 0.40. This parameterization leads to the following income states,
y ∈ {0.14, 0.27, 0.52, 1.00, 1.89, 3.57, 6.75}. The resulting transition matrix, whose elements are
reported in percent for convenience, is:
pi =

88.0433 11.3314 0.6077 0.0174 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
1.8886 88.2458 9.4515 0.4053 0.0087 0.0001 0.0000
0.0405 3.7806 88.3675 7.5647 0.2432 0.0035 0.0000
0.0009 0.1216 5.6735 88.4080 5.6735 0.1216 0.0009
0.0000 0.0035 0.2432 7.5647 88.3675 3.7806 0.0405
0.0000 0.0001 0.0087 0.4053 9.4515 88.2458 1.8886
0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0174 0.6077 11.3314 88.0433

.
5.1.2 The Case of Full Insurance Contracts
We now need to specify the asset structure available to the agent. Let us first consider the
case in which agents have access to full insurance, which means that A > N − 1, as the set
of contingent assets, together with the risk-free asset, allows to span the state space. Then,
assuming that borrowing is only limited by the natural debt limits, full insurance is possible.
If agents pay the participation cost κ to access insurance markets at any date t, each period
consumption equals:
ct(y0, B0;κ) = r
B0 +∑
t≥0
E0(wyt)
(1 + r)t
− κ, (8)
with y0 and B0 denoting, respectively, the initial level of income and the initial level of asset
holdings. With full insurance, as pointed out in Caselli and Ventura (2000), consumption, and
therefore saving, depends on initial conditions. If agents had access to the full set of contingent
assets, would they pay the participation cost to be fully insured? Using equation (8) and the
corresponding flow of utility under perfect insurance, V (y0, B0;κ) =
1
1−βu(c(y0, B0)), we can
derive, for illustrative purposes, a simple necessary condition for perfect insurance, by comparing
the value function for agents deciding not to participate to insurance markets for one period
before fully insuring in the rest of the periods (i.e. one-shot deviation from full insurance) to the
case in which they decide to get full insurance right away; this comparison is clearly a function
of the participation cost κ.13 This comparison clearly depends on initial conditions and, in
particular, on the initial wealth level. Given our theoretical results, we know that, with any
positive level of participation costs, there always exists a level of wealth so that agents prefer
not to participate to financial markets. Accordingly, using our calibration, Figure 2 plots the
level of wealth, as a fraction of average labor income, above which agents are surely not fully
insured.
As a consequence, if the initial wealth distribution is not so dispersed, full insurance can
13As mentioned, this comparison only yields a necessary condition: if this condition is such that agents opt for
full insurance, this does not necessarily mean that an equilibrium will full insurance exist. For example, agents
may be better off not participating to insurance markets over multiple periods.
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Figure 2 – Wealth threshold (in fraction of average labor income)
Note: the graph plots the threshold level of wealth (measured as wealth to income ratio) above which agents
prefer a one-shot deviation from full insurance, as a function of the participation cost κ.
be an equilibrium outcome, and, in this case, the resulting variables of the model are heavily
dependent of initial conditions and are very sensitive to the income process. Therefore, in order
to better understand the relationship between participation costs and partial insurance, in the
rest of the paper we assume asset structures that depart from complete markets, as clearly
described in the next section.
Even if based on a necessary condition, Figure 2 illustrates that the threshold level of wealth
above which there is only partial insurance could be high, at least for very small participation
costs. As a consequence, if the initial wealth distribution is not so dispersed, full insurance can
be an equilibrium outcome, and, in this case, the resulting variables of the model are heavily
dependent of initial conditions and are very sensitive to the income process. Importantly, such
a situation does not arise when markets are incomplete even under participation: in this latter
case, as in the Aiyagari model, the remaining uninsurable risk leads the equilibrium wealth
distribution to be less dependent on initial conditions.14
Therefore, in order to better understand the relationship between participation costs and
partial insurance, in the rest of the paper we assume asset structures that depart from complete
markets, as described in the next section.
5.1.3 Asset structure and participation cost
We adopt a benchmark structure that allows a clear comparison of the performance of the
model for a large range of participation cost, from very high to zero. To do so, in all structures
we consider we make full insurance infeasible, which means that even if households pay the
participation cost, they can still only insure part of their idiosyncratic risk. As mentioned
earlier, this assumption serves two purposes; first, in this case our model is much less sensitive
sensitive to the calibration of the income process, which varies a lot in the extant literature,15
14See Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018) for a discussion of equilibrium multiplicity in the Aiyagari model.
15If full insurance were available, only agents in the middle of the wealth distribution would be completely
insured and therefore face no income uncertainty. Hence they would optimally run down their wealth, and they
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and, second, even with full participation the model does not degenerate into a complete market
model.
We now describe in the details the assumptions for our benchmark asset structure: (i) state
contingent assets are available only to insure against downward risk; (ii) for any agent with
current income yi, with i = {2, .., 6} the only state contingent asset available is the asset indexed
by (yi−1|yi); (iii) for any agent with the highest current income realization, y7, the only state
contingent asset available is the asset indexed by (y5|y7). The first assumption aims to capture
properties of healthy or unemployment insurance, which usually allow to receive a payoff only
conditionally on the realization of a bad state; the second assumption aims to capture, albeit in
a reduced form, the existence of uninsurable entrepreneurial risk, in the same spirit as Quadrini
(2000). Hence, more formally, we assume that: A(yi) = {yi−1},∀i = {2, ..., 6}; A(y7) = {y5};
and A(y1) = ∅. These assumptions are not crucial for the results, as alternative asset structures
in which insurance is for both some upward and downward risk or in which risk is insurable
even for higher income states lead to similar implications, as it will be shown in Section 5.6 and
5.7.
Remark. The assumed benchmark asset structure is the result of a clear tradeoff. From one side,
risk averse agents are mainly concerned about downward risk and therefore it makes sense not
to restrict too much their access to state contingent assets against that type of risk. Given the
transition of the Markov process displayed above, it turns out that this asset structure poten-
tially allows insurance for 94 percent of the population that faces downward risk. On the other
hand, we also know that there are multiple equilibria due to the possibility of additional insur-
ance.16 This feature is inconvenient when comparing the properties of the model for different
participation costs. In contrast, by leaving some uninsured risk, we allow agents to accumulate
wealth, no matter the level of costs
The assumption that agents can insure only against downward risk makes short sale con-
straints on the contingent assets non binding. In this case, in fact, agents that do participate in
the contingent asset market will optimally get a long position in those assets. Hence, in equi-
librium, it will be the case that a′(y′) ≥ 0. In addition, as in Aiyagari (1994) we assume that
the constraint on non-contingent asset is B = 0. We will relax this constraint in the robustness
section to show that it does not affect significantly the main mechanisms of the model.
Participation cost Finally, we assume that the cost of participation to the state contingent
asset market is a fixed proportion of the current income state. This means that an agent with
current income state yi has to pay a cost equal to κi = κyi to have access to the assets in
would not be able to transit above the full insurance region. As a result, the rich group might not exist in the
invariant distribution unless the poor households can jump to the rich group by having a sufficiently high income
shock. As a consequence, slightly different income process could lead to very different equilibria.
16If too much downward insurance is feasible, when the participation cost is very small the model becomes
very close to the full insurance case, for which, as showed by Caselli and Ventura (2000), the equilibrium would
be dependent on the assumed initial distribution.
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A(yi).17 In the quantitative analysis we will vary the constant κ to investigate the effects of
cost of insurance. The mechanisms of the model are unchanged to assuming a constant cost
across income realizations, instead. In Section 5.5, we also present the results of our simulations
with constant costs.
The last but important ingredient for the calibration is the equilibrium selection procedure
and the initial conditions that we use. Our strategy is the following: we start by simulating the
economy with a very large cost so that the economy is an Aiyagari one and then we smoothly
decrease the participation cost all the way down to 0.18
5.2 Participation Cost and Partial Insurance
In Figure 3 we display the percentage of agents in the economy that participate in the
contingent asset market, as a function of the parameter κ. When the participation cost is very
large, all agents decide to only self-insure. In this case there is no participation in the contingent
asset market and the model is equivalent to the Aiyagari’s economy. Oppositely, when the cost
is zero, everyone participates in the insurance market, since the properties of the utility function
imply a strictly positive gain of insurance, as proved in Proposition 2. When the participation
cost is at an intermediate level, only a fraction of agents participates in the contingent asset
market, and the model delivers endogenous partial insurance. Notice that even a very small cost,
for example κ = 0.005, which is 0.5 percent of income, leads to a partial insurance equilibrium.
Not surprisingly the amount of participation is monotonically decreasing with the cost.
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Figure 3 – Participation and Cost
Note: This graph plots the aggregate participation to the state contingent asset market as a function of the
cost κ.
Which agents do and do not get insurance with small positive costs? In Figure 4 we answer
this question highlighting the main mechanism of the model. Specifically, the figure displays
the state contingent asset market participation decision as a solid blue bar, for agents with
17As welfare participation costs, instead of monetary costs, are homeomorphic, one could alternatively interpret
this specification as opportunity cost of time for agents with different income levels.
18More specifically, the sequence of costs that we consider is {1000, 10, 2, 1, 0.5, 0.25, 0.10, 0.075, 0.05, 0.04, 0.03, 0.025, 0.020, 0.0150.010, 0.005, 0}.
Notice that as Figure 3 displays any cost greater or equal to 1 generates zero participation. Therefore, the fact
that the cost sequence is very sparse from 1 to 1000 does not constitute a problem.
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different income realization (x-axis) and different wealth (y-axis). The red dot reports the
highest level of wealth observed for each income states, which are quite different across the
different models.19 Results are showed for three different costs. In the top panel we fix the cost
to a very large number, 1000, so that the economy coincides with the Aiyagari’s one. In this
case there is no participation. In the bottom panel we fix the cost to zero. In this case there
is full participation. Most importantly, in the central panel, we fix the cost to κ = 0.04, a cost
value that, as it will be seen in the next subsection, implies the highest inequality and, therefore,
is able to better highlight the mechanism of endogenous partial insurance. In the next section
we discuss the quantitative implications of assuming smaller costs. With κ = 0.04 participation
is limited and endogenous. Income poor agents, regardless their wealth, receive a very small
flow of resources and for them the cost to participate in the state contingent asset markets is
too high. Agents with middle/high income realizations, instead, display heterogenous behavior;
if they are wealth rich, that is for any wealth level outside the participation bar, they decide
not to participate and to self insure. Otherwise, if they have lower wealth, they do participate.
This behavior is consistent with the finding in Proposition 3. Finally, notice that with our
benchmark structure, according to which agents with the highest income cannot insure against
the most likely downward risk, those agents prefer not to pay the cost and self-insure, since the
gain of insuring against a quite unlikely event is lower than the benefit.
While Figure 4 displays one of the main mechanism of the model, i.e. the relationship
between endogenous insurance decision and wealth, it does not shed light on the proportion of
agents that belong to the insurance region, since that proportion is a function of the stationary
joint distribution of income and wealth. Figure 5 clarifies this point by showing the participation
share for each income realization, for the cost equal to 0.04; it highlights that the largest fraction
of agents have wealth levels that belong to the insurance bar and only a small fraction of very
rich agents that do not insure.
5.3 Interest rate, asset accumulation, and inequality
Interest Rate One of the implications of partial insurance concerns the equilibrium interest
rate. As we will explain below, the evolution of the interest rate is an important component of
one of the main mechanism of the model, since it affects the speed by which agents accumulate
assets. Figure 6a plots the equilibrium interest rate as a function of the participation cost.
When reducing the participation cost, the risk-free rate increases from Aiyagari economy’s
value,20 when there is no participation, to a value very close to the discount rate, when there is
full participation.21 This captures the smoothed evolution of aggregate partial insurance from
19We compute the wealth distribution by simulating 10000000 agents.
20As pointed out in Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993) when households have only risk-free bonds to self-
insure against idiosyncratic shocks, the interest rate paid on these bonds is lower than the interest rate paid when
markets are complete. The intuition for this result is simply that high level of interest rates would incentivize
households to accumulate an infinite amount of assets, which would allow them to consume infinitely and, of
course, to be perfectly insured.
21Recall that even with zero cost the model does not generate full insurance, because of the assumed asset
structure.
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Figure 4 – Participation and Cost
Note: This graph plots participation decisions for agents with different income realizations (x-axis) and different
wealth (y-axis). Each blue bar represents participation to the state contingent asset markets. The red dot
displays the highest level of wealth observed for each income state. We compute these statistics for three models;
the top one is the Aiyagari model, which corresponds to the case of large participation costs; the central one
is the model with a participation cost equal to κ = 0.04; the bottom model assumes zero participation costs,
κ = 0.
self insurance in the Aiyagari case to full participation with zero cost.
When the participation cost is low enough so that some agents acquire contingent assets, the
demand for risk free assets declines and the demand for contingent assets increases, as tracked
by the solid line (left y-axis) and the dashed line (right y-axis), respectively, in Figure 6b. The
resulting overall smaller supply of capital creates an upward force to the interest rate.
Inequality, Lorenz Curve, and Concentration at the top How does the existence of
participation costs in contingent asset markets affect the wealth distribution? The answer
to this question depends on the interaction between participation costs, income risk, wealth,
and interest rate. When there is endogenous partial insurance, two forces operate in different
portions of the wealth distribution. On the one hand, insured households do not have incentive
to accumulate a lot of assets, since their downward risk is mostly covered by the state contingent
asset; we label this effect as participation channel. On the other hand, self-insured households,
which are the one that have larger wealth, benefit from real interest rates that are higher than
in the Aiyagari model and they accumulate more wealth. This force pushes the right tail of the
distribution even further to the right; we label this effect as interest rate channel. Together,
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Figure 5 – Participation and Cost
Note: This graph plots the percentage of agents that participate in the state contingent asset market for
different income realizations (x-axis) for a participation cost equal to κ = 0.04. Hence, this figure infers the
density of agents that belong in the wealth participation interval displayed in the central panel of Figure 4.
1000 10 2 1 0.5 0.25 0.1 0.075 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.025 0.02 0.015 0.01 0.005 0
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
0.055
0.06
0.065
In
te
re
st
 ra
te
(a) Interest Rate
1000 10 2 1 0.5 0.25 0.1 0.075 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.025 0.02 0.015 0.01 0.005 0
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
R
is
k 
fre
e 
As
se
t
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
Co
nt
in
ge
nt
 A
ss
et
(b) Assets
Figure 6 – Interest Rate, Assets, and Cost
Note: The left panel plots the equilibrium interest rate for non-contingent assets as a function of the partici-
pation cost parameters κ. The right panel plots the equilibrium level of risk free assets (solid line, left y-axis)
and of state contingent assets (dashed line, right y-axis).
these two forces contribute to skew the wealth distribution and lead to large wealth inequality.
The combined strength of these two channels is not necessarily monotone with respect to
participation cost, as displayed in Figure 7 in which we plot the wealth Gini index as a function of
κ. Wealth inequality is relatively low for the Aiyagari model, and it increases quite sharply when
participation and the interest rate increase; nevertheless, when participation is already very large
and the interest rate is already quite close to the discount rate, additional decline in cost and
additional participation reduces inequality. Intuitively when costs are tiny even wealthier agents
acquire state contingent assets and, therefore, they have no incentive to accumulate wealth. For
our calibration and asset structure, the level of cost that maximizes inequality is κ = 0.04,
which corresponds of an average of cost of 3.70% of average income, i.e. roughly $2220 per year,
assuming an average yearly income of $60000), once one considers the correspondent equilibrium
wage level.
While the cost that maximizes inequality is still quite high, assuming lower costs do not
change drastically the quantitative implications of the model, as shown in Table 1. It is never-
theless fair to compare these costs with the estimates found in the literature for financial market
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participation. Honka (2014) estimates demand for insurance and quantifies search cost in the
US auto insurance industry, finding that the cost of a price search through local agents, mail,
and calling centers ranges from $100 to $170. Ho et al. (2017) study expansion to the Medi-
care program in 2006 to estimate search friction in consumer choices; they estimate indicate
that removing those frictions could reduce consumer expenditures by around $330 per enrolee
per year. Finally, Lin and Wildenbeest (2019) estimate search friction in the U.S. Medigap
insurance market and they find that it ranges from 13 to151$. Related to a more general defini-
tion of financial markets, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002b) estimates the median of per-period cost for
stock market participation to be around $204, in 1982-84 dollars, whose purchasing power cor-
responds roughly to 480 dollars of year 2017. Attanasio and Paiella (2011b) and Paiella (2007b)
estimate per-period participation costs in stock markets and provide a lower bound in units of
nondurable consumption, as low as 0.4% and 0.7% of consumption per year, which is roughly in
the range 117$-205$. Khorunzhina (2013) provide evidence that the average per-period stock
market participation cost, measured as a share of income, ranges between 4% and 6% of labor
income for non participants. Finally, and on the high end of costs, Kaplan and Violante (2014)
use a level of cost up to $1000 to obtain realistic portfolios for private agents for illiquid assets,
which is roughly 2 percent of average annual income. As the goal of this paper is not to estimate
a participation cost for state contingent assets market, but to illustrate as clearly as possible
the novel mechanism of the participation channel, to keep the exposition clear we will assume
a fixed cost equal to 0.04, when needed.
κ 0.04 0.01 0.005
USD equivalent 2220 558 282
Gini index 0.77 0.75 0.75
Interest Rate 6.19% 6.35% 6.39%
Table 1 – Participation Costs
Note: This table presents some summary statistics of the endogenous partial insurance model (i.e. wealth
Gini index and interest rate) for three different costs: κ = 0.04, which is the one that maximizes the wealth
Gini index, κ = 0.01, and κ = 0.005. The USD equivalent is computed for the average income household with
$60000 and accounting for the equilibrium wage rate in the economy.
The comparison between inequality at zero cost and with a positive costs highlight the
importance of the participation effect with endogenous partial insurance, which stems from
heterogeneity of agents’ decision in the economy, from exogenous partial insurance, which stems
from simply assuming the non-existence of some assets.
Table 2 reports the different wealth concentration for a model with large cost, so that the
economy is identical to the Aiyagari one, for a model with a participation cost equal to 0.04,
which is the one that maximizes the Gini index, and for a model with no costs. Endogenous
partial insurance generated by κ = 0.04 increases the share of wealth for the top 1% with
respect to the standard incomplete market model and also to a model with full participation,
although this share remains smaller than in the data. This means that the larger wealth Gini
index in the endogenous partial insurance model mainly comes from the large differences in
wealth accumulation across bigger segments of the population, i.e the wealth-poor/middle and
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Figure 7 – Participation and Cost
Note: this graph plots the wealth Gini index as a function of the participation cost parameters κ.
middle/large wealth groups. In fact, for the top 5% or even more for the top 10% the wealth
concentration is substantially higher in the endogenous partial insurance model. Overall, a
model with endogenous partial insurance leads to very high wealth concentration to the top 10,
5, and at a lower degree 1 percent, with respect to the rest of the population. Figure 8 displays
the complete wealth distributions, under the form of Lorenz curves, together with the 45 degree
line.
Model Data
Aiyagari Cost =0.04 Zero cost
Gini index 0.58 0.77 0.74 0.85
Top 1% 6.9% 17.8% 13.6% 34.1%
Top 5% 23.9% 44.1% 39.2% 60.9%
Top 10% 38.2% 60.3% 56.3% 74.4%
Table 2 – Share of Wealth held by percentile
Note: This table presents the concentration of wealth on the top 1,5, an 10 percent of the wealth distribution
in the Aiyagari model, endogenous partial insurance model generated by a cost κ = 0.04 , and a model with
zero cost. Data values come from Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2014), Table 14.6.
To further point out the relation between wealth, participation, and implied concentration,
in Figure 9 we display the average participation rate, in percent, for the different deciles of the
wealth distribution. Clearly, the Aiyagari economy (dotted blue line) and the economy with
no costs, (dashed red line) represent the two extreme cases, in which nobody and everybody,
respectively, participate in the contingent asset market. The pattern for the positive cost (solid
black line) highlights the heterogenous behavior of agents with different wealth; consistently
with our theoretical results, very few wealthy poor buy state contingent assets; middle class
agents consistently participate in the insurance market; and participation reduces for wealthy
rich people, as their large amount of wealth and the high interest rate allow them to accumulate
a large amount of resources to self-insure, thus avoiding to pay the participation cost.
Degree of partial insurance In their paper Guvenen and Smith (2014) estimate the fraction
of partial insurance around 45 percent. In our benchmark model, the aggregate participation
level is 86.6 percent. Because the assumed asset structure and the assumed transition matrix of
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Note: This graph plots the Lorenz curve for the Aiyagari model (dotted blue line), endogenous partial insurance
model generated by a cost κ = 0.04 (solid black line), and a model with zero cost (dashed red line). The solid
thin line represents the 45 degree line.
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Figure 9 – Wealth and Participation
Note: this graph plots the share of agents that participate in the state contingent asset market in the wealth
deciles. We compute these statistics for three models; the Aiyagari model (dotted blue line); the model with a
participation cost equal to κ = 0.04 (solid black line); and a model with zero cost (dashed red line).
income implies that 47 percent of total income risk is insurable,22 our model leads to a degree
of partial insurance of 40.7 percent, a value close to the one estimated in Guvenen and Smith
(2014). Our definition of partial insurance can be linked to the one introduced in Guvenen
and Smith (2014); however, whereas their form of partial insurance is on the intensive margin -
agents can insure a fraction of their income, in our setting partial insurance is on the extensive
margin - agents can be insured or not, given the assumed asset structure.
5.4 Consumption smoothing and insurance
What are the implications of the endogenous partial insurance model for consumption
smoothing and insurance? In this section we explore this question, particularly pointing out
that the predictions of endogenous partial insurance are quite different than the one for the
22The assumed exogenous asset structure implies that 0 percent of upward risk and 96 percent of downward
risk is insurable, and both upward and downward account for half of the total risk, as implied by the transition
matrix pi.
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Aiyagari economy. We show that the assumed benchmark asset structure is useful to highlight
the different roles played by the participation channel and by the interest channel.
Participation Channel To quantify the role of the participation channel we focus now on
negative income shocks, as they are, by assumption, the only insurable shocks. Our theoretical
results imply clear predictions about participation: poor households’ consumption is particularly
sensitive to negative income shocks, as they have too low income to participate in the state
contingent asset markets and they might be also borrowing constrained; middle class agents are
well insured, as they decide to participate in the contingent asset market; wealthy households’
consumption is somewhat still subject to negative income shock as they endogenously decide to
self insure. These predictions are indeed born out in our model with partial insurance. Figure
10a displays the model-implied coefficient αj of the regression:
∆ci,j = αj∆yi,j1∆yi,j<0 + ηi,with j = 1, .., 10, (9)
where ∆ci,j denotes consumption growth of a household i that belongs to the wealth decile j
and ∆yi,j1∆yi,j<0 are the negative, and therefore insurable, income shocks. Hence αj is the
consumption-income pass through, conditional on negative income shocks, for wealth decile j.
The coefficients are plotted for the two models of interest, the endogenous partial insurance
model (solid black line) and the Aiyagari model (dotted blue line). As state contingent assets
are available, consumption is overall less sensitive to negative income shocks. However, since the
first wealth quantiles are populated by income poor agents that cannot afford to pay the par-
ticipation cost, the consumption-income pass-through is quite high. Middle-class agents, in the
contrary, heavily participate in the insurance market and, as a consequence, their consumption
is almost perfectly shielded against negative income shocks. Finally, richer agents are slightly
less insured against those shocks as some of them do not participate in the state contingent
market; nevertheless, their large amount of financial assets allow them to self-insure quite well.
The interest rate channel Figure 10b plots the regression coefficients αj when not restrict-
ing income shocks to be negative: roughly the bottom half of the wealth distribution is overall
more sensitive to income shocks than in the Aiyagari model, while the top half of the distribution
is less sensitive. The comparison between the two panels implies that in the endogenous partial
insurance equilibrium agents smooth positive income shocks at a lower degree, especially in the
lowest part of the wealth distribution. This effect is the result of the interest rate channel. In
fact, poors’ insurance ability is deteriorated by higher interest rates than in the Aiyagari model;
in both economies the only tool to insure against upward risk is dissaving, which is much more
costly in the endogenous partial insurance model than in the Aiyagari model. That explains
why, in the bottom half of the distribution, aggregate consumption-income pass through is
larger than in the Aiyagari model; agents in that part of the distribution are more subject to
uninsurable upward risk, as they are already in the bottom part of the income distribution, and
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for them self-insurance is more costly. On the contrary, the top-half of the distribution is pop-
ulated by a larger share of agents that face insurable downward risk. Their participation in the
state contingent asset market, and the higher return on their saving, enhance their consumption
smoothing ability, and, therefore, in that part of the distribution the consumption-income pass
through is lower than in the Aiyagari model. The comparison between the two panels of Figure
10 highlight the different roles of the participation and interest rate channels. The former tends
to enhance consumption smoothing, while the latter have heterogenous effects on consumption
smoothing across the wealth distribution. The overall net effect is a function of the relative
strength of the two channels and it heavily depends on the assumed asset structure, as we will
point out in Section 5.6.
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Figure 10 – Consumption Income Pass-through
Note: the left panel plots the coefficients αj for the regression in (9) for the 10 wealth deciles in the Aiyagari
model (dashed blue line) and in the endogenous partial insurance model with a positive cost equal to 0.04
(solid black line). The right panel plots the coefficients αj for the same regression when not conditioning on
only negative income shocks.
The distribution of consumption growth We further explore the implications of endoge-
nous partial insurance on the joint distribution of consumption, income and wealth, by plotting
in Figure 11 the distribution of consumption growth in the endogenous partial insurance model
(solid black line) and the Aiyagari model (dotted blue line). As expected, the participation
of the state contingent asset market truncates the distribution of consumption growth in the
partial insurance model with respect to the Aiyagari model; although obviously negative con-
sumption growth is observed, because of the agents that do not pay the participation costs and
because of our assumption that part of the downward risk is uninsurable, a significant portion
of the density of consumption growth moves from the negative side to the positive side. This
shift of density is exacerbated by the interest rate channel, as risk-free assets accumulation
generates higher return and thus enhances higher consumption. These effects lead to slightly
higher standard deviation and skewness of the consumption growth distribution in the partial
insurance model.
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Figure 11 – Consumption Growth
Note: This graph plots the distribution of consumption growth in the Aiyagari model (dashed blue line) and
in the endogenous partial insurance model with a positive cost equal to 0.04 (solid black line).
The Marginal Propensity of Consumption out of Wealth How does the endogenous
partial insurance model affect the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth? In a recent
paper Carroll et al. (2017) point out that standard macroeconomic models that attempt to
match wealth inequality imply too low marginal propensity to consume, which, in the empirical
literature is estimated to range between 0.2 and 0.6.23 Standard representative agent models
usually deliver a MPC about 0.02-0.04, while heterogenous agents model have potentials to imply
a larger MPC when incorporating additional ingredients.24 In Figure 12 we plot the marginal
propensity of consumption out of wealth for the endogenous partial insurance model associated
to a participation cost equal to 0.04 (solid black line) and the Aiyagari model (dotted blue line)
across the wealth distribution.25 In aggregate, the implied MPC is higher in the endogenous
partial insurance model (0.092) than in the standard Aiyagari model (0.071), to indicate that
the mechanisms underlying endogenous partial insurance contributes to generate overall slightly
higher MPC. In addition, the difference between the two models is more pronounced in the
central part of the wealth distribution, where both the participation and interest rate channels
operate; the existence of state contingent assets make participating agents to consume a larger
fraction of extra wealth, as they do not need to over-accumulate assets to self-insure. The
impact of this channel for MPC depends on the assumed asset structure and on the overall
participation.
5.5 The role of participation costs, borrowing constraint
In our benchmark calibration, we have assumed that participation costs are proportional to
income and that the borrowing constraint for the non-contingent asset is tight, that is B¯ = 0. In
this subsection, we investigate how our results are modified when relaxing these two assumptions.
23See Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) for a review in this topic.
24Kaplan and Violante (2014) and Kaplan et al. (2018) for examples introduce illiquid assets and that generates
higher aggregate level of MPC and non-monotone MPC across wealth.
25The MPC out of wealth is computed by averaging the numerical derivative of the consumption policy function
with respect to total wealth for each wealth decile.
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Figure 12 – Marginal propensity of consumption out of wealth
Note: this graph plots the marginal propensity of consumption out of wealth for the Aiyagari model (dashed
blue line) and in the endogenous partial insurance model with a positive cost equal to 0.04 (solid black line)
across the wealth deciles. The MPC out of wealth is computed by averaging the numerical derivative of the
consumption policy function with respect to total wealth for each wealth decile.
Borrowing constraint Let us first consider borrowing constraints that allow for some bor-
rowing (B¯ < 0). Table 4 reports the level of wealth inequality for different levels of borrowing
constraints but the same level of participation cost.
Aiyagari Cost =0.04
borrowing limit /average income Wealth Gini index
B¯/avg(wY ) = 0 0.58 0.77
B¯/avg(wY ) = −7% 0.58 0.75
B¯/avg(wY ) = −14% 0.57 0.73
Participation
B¯/avg(wY ) = 0 0% 77.7%
B¯/avg(wY ) = −7% 0% 76.6%
B¯/avg(wY ) = −14% 0% 70.4%
Table 3 – The effects of borrowing constraints
Note: This table presents the wealth Gini index (top panel) and aggregate participation (bottom panel) in the
Aiyagari model and endogenous partial insurance model generated by a cost κ = 0.04 when assuming three
different borrowing limit in the risk-free asset: no borrowing allowed, a borrowing limit of 7% of income, and
a borrowing limit of 14% of income.
The possibility of some borrowing does not alter qualitatively the results, but it has still
some quantitative, albeit not drastic, consequences. Even when there is possibility to borrow,
wealth inequality in the partial insurance model is quite larger than in the Aiyagari model but
it is slightly reduced. Intuitively, in that case the risk free asset becomes a better insurance
instrument and that reduces participation in the state contingent assets, which, in turns, di-
minishes the strength of the participation channel. Nevertheless, the main take away is that
the results do not depend significantly by having assumed a zero borrowing constraint in the
benchmark specification of the model.
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The cost structure In our benchmark calibration, we have assumed that the cost is pro-
portional to income, that is κ(y) = κy. Let us investigate how the economy is modified when
considering constant costs across the income distribution, that assuming κ(y) = κ.
Aiyagari Cost =0.04
Cost structure Gini index
κ(y) = κy 0.58 0.77
κ= constant 0.58 0.71
Participation
κ(y) = κy 0% 77.7%
κ= constant 0% 65.3%
Table 4 – The effects of the cost structure
Note: This table presents the wealth Gini index (top panel) and aggregate participation (bottom panel) in
the Aiyagari model and endogenous partial insurance model generated by a cost κ = 0.04 when assuming
two different cost structures: participation cost as constant fraction of income κ(y) = κy, and a constant
participation cost.
As Table 4 shows, with constant costs across income levels, the wealth Gini index is lower
than with income dependent costs: the main reason is that the participation channel is weaker
in the first case. Actually, constant costs are also skewing the cross-section of participation:
participation is not only lower but richer households tend to participate more with constant
cost and and poorer households will participate less. This finding is intuitive as average income
is 1, so households with income below (above) average face a higher (lower) participation cost
when it is fixed than when it is proportional to income. Overall, the cost structure affects only
quantitatively the results and not qualitatively.
5.6 Alternative Symmetric Asset Structure
The results discussed in this section are general and also apply to symmetric asset struc-
tures. As an illustrative example, we now assume an alternative asset structure, labelled as
A1, which, unlike the benchmark case, features symmetry. We assume that only agents with
the mean/median income realization, y4, have access to state contingent assets for the most
likely downward and upward risk. State contingent assets do not exists for other states. Hence,
formally, A1(y4) = {y3, y5}; and A1(yi) = ∅, ∀i 6= 4. Notice that this asset structure features
both downward and upward insurance and, given the assumed income process, it implies that
22 percent of agents have exogenously access to insurance. For the analysis in this subsection
we continue to fix the participation cost to κ = 0.04, for a clear comparison to the benchmark
structure. Notice that in this case, as only one income group has access to the state contingent
assets, the participation cost proportional to income is equivalent to a constant one. Also, with
the possibility of insurance against upward risk, agents might want to go short on the state
contingent assets: we allow for this possibility as we set the exogenous borrowing constraint for
those assets, a¯, to the natural borrowing limit.
As for the benchmark structure, the asset structure A1 implies a wealth Gini index, equal
to 0.64, and an interest rate, equal to 2.75 percent, that are higher than in the Aiyagari model,
although by less than in the case of the benchmark structure. The fact that the interest rate is
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not so different from the Aiyagari model is particularly useful as this implies that in this case
the interest rate channel is almost fully muted, and, therefore, this symmetric alternative asset
structure allow us to isolate the participation channel.
Figure 13 displays the participation decision, for different income levels in Figure 13a, and
for different wealth levels in Figure 13b. The left panel shows that, by construction, only
agents with median income have access to state contingent assets, and, among them, 82 percent
endogenously decide to participate. The right panel helps understanding where the participating
agents are located in the wealth distribution. The asymmetry in the graph highlights that agents
that decide to not acquire state contingent assets are the richest.
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Figure 13 – Participation with Symmetric Asset Structure
Note: The left panel plots the percentage of agents that participate in the state contingent asset market for
different income realizations (x-axis) for the asymmetric alternative asset structure when assuming a cost equal
to κ = 0.04. The right panel plots participation decisions for agents with different income realizations (x-axis)
and different wealth (y-axis) Each blue bar represents participation to the state contingent asset markets. The
red dot displays the highest level of wealth observed for each income state.
In Figure 14 we report the implied consumption insurance, which are the coefficients αj of
the consumption growth-income growth regression, for different wealth deciles:
∆ci,j = αj∆yi,j + ηi,with j = 1, .., 10. (10)
In the first two quantiles of the wealth distribution, in which there are no insured agents,
the symmetric asset structure (solid black line) implies that consumption is more sensitive
to income shocks than in the Aiyagari economy, as dissaving is slightly more costly. The
difference is therefore only due to the very small interest rate channel. In the central part
of the distribution, participation is larger, and since participating agents are heavily insured
with the assumed alternative asset structure, the consumption-income pass through is very low.
Notice that the degree of insurance declines while moving towards the wealthier portion of the
distribution, as, there, participation declines. The top of the distribution is only slightly more
insured than in the Aiyagari economy, because of, once again, the small interest rate channel
that generates higher return for savings.26
26This particular effect is consistent with Guvenen (2007), which finds that financially wealthy agents do less
consumption smoothing that agents with less financial wealth.
36
In summary, the alternative asset structure generates an aggregate shape of insurance across
the wealth distribution that is quite different than the one for the benchmark asset structure, al-
though it highlights exactly the same mechanisms; while in the benchmark asymmetric structure
the interest rate channel is quite strong, in the alternative symmetric structure the participation
channels largely dominates.
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Figure 14 – Insurance with Symmetric Asset Structure
Note: the graph plots the coefficients αj for the regression in equation (10) for the 10 wealth deciles in the
Aiyagari model (dashed blue line) and in the endogenous partial insurance model with a positive cost equal to
0.04 (solid black line) for the alternative asset structure.
5.7 Additional asset structures
We further investigate the role of the insurance structure to show that our results are robust
to different assumptions. Specifically, we want to highlight that: (i) the possibility of downward
insurance could be extended further with respect to what is assumed in the benchmark structure;
and (ii) uninsurable entrepreneurial risk is not a necessary ingredient for obtaining the main
results.
Consider the following alternative asset structures.
Alternative Structure 2: more downward insurance The second alternative assumes
that all downward risk is insurable to agents, except the uninsurable entrepreneurial risk, as
we interpreted the transition from income state 7 to income state 6. Hence, formally, A3(yi) =
{y1, ..., yi−1}, ∀i = {2, ..., 6}; A3(y7) = {y1, ..., y5}; and A3(y1) = ∅.
Alternative Asset Structure 3: no entrepreneurial risk The third alternative assumes
that all downward risk is insurable to agents, including the entrepreneurial risk Hence, formally,
A4(yi) = {y1, ..., yi−1}, ∀i = {2, ..., 7}; and A4(y1) = ∅.
Alternative Asset Structure 4: no insurance at the bottom The forth alternative
assumes that it is the lowest states that are less insurable, while the top income states can enjoy
downward insurance. Formally: A4(yi) = {yi−1}, ∀i = {3, ..., 7} and A4(y1) = A4(y2) = ∅.
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Aiyagari Cost =0.04
Benchmark Sym. more downward ins. no entrepr. risk no ins. bottom
A A1 A2 A3 A4
Particip. (%) 0 85.9 26.1 87.0 87.9 87.9
Gini index 0.58 0.77 0.65 0.85 0.86 0.81
Table 5 – Implications of Asset structures
Note: This table displays aggregate participation and the wealth Gini index for the Aiyagari model (first column) which
is independent on the assumed asset structure as no agents acquire state contingent assets for large enough costs, and
in the endogenous partial insurance model when assuming κ = 0.04, for the benchmark asset structure A, and for the
four alternative structures A1, A2, A3, A4.
As Table 5 displays, the increased inequality in the endogenous partial insurance model
with respect to the standard Aiyagari model does not primarily come from the direction of the
asymmetry of the insurance structure or from the existence of some uninsurable risk for the
highest income agents. At the end, what is more important and drive the results is how the
possibility of insurance, and therefore the participation channel affects asset accumulation.
6 Further extensions and discussion
Contingent assets in “real life” In our framework, the only exogenous shock is on labor
endowment, which, given the nature of the model, is equivalent to labor income. If it is difficult
to think about insurance products that help to hedge against wage shock for an employee of a
firm, it is more natural to think about insurance products for health shocks or unemployment
shocks – in the case where these kinds of shocks can be insured voluntarily.
Note that, interestingly, this possibility of voluntary insurance still remains even in countries
where there exist compulsory public insurance. An example is France where health shocks are
partially insured through a public system, they can be further insured by an additional private
system, for which the individual has some decision power.
Heterogeneity in insurance However, the number of examples where we can clearly identify
the distribution of insurance is quite limited. When we are able to observe these insurance
decisions, one can observe a lot of heterogeneity in the population, sometimes connected with
observable variables as wealth or income. For example, Brown and Finkelstein (2007) document
lower private long-term care insurance coverage for poorer households. An additional example
is provided by Cole et al. (2009) who show that credit constraints are a key determinant of
insurance when studying insurance decision of Indian farmers against rainfall variability.
Interpreting participation costs. A first interpretation of participation costs is a monetary
one. These monetary costs arise from financial or insurance intermediaries, possibly related to
sunk costs due to an intermediaries’ production functions or to screening costs, when agents
have to signal their type by willing to pay the fixed costs.27
27The exact setting leading to this kind of fixed cost would be a dynamic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976).
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A second interpretation of participation costs is that they include cognitive costs or shopping-
costs: selecting insurance requires time and effort. In line with this approach is the observation
by Cole and Shastry (2009) that education is also an important determinant of insurance deci-
sions.
Another alternative form of fixed cost faced by households surfaces when collecting insur-
ance payments when bad shocks occur. Collection requires proofs of damage to address the
adverse selection problem. Assuming this alternative form of participation cost would not qual-
itatively change our results: it would also prevent agents from purchasing insurance against
small shocks, and would lead to preferences for purchasing insurance only against large shocks.
In this situation, as in our setting, poorer households cannot afford to pay the insurance.
Connection with the lack of commitment model. Another model of limited insurance
is the lack of commitment model. In this model, agents’ inability to commit to repay limits risk
sharing among agents. For example, in its one-sided no commitment version – agents cannot
commit to repay their debts but they can save using reliable instruments (see Thomas and
Worrall (1988) as an example) –, this inability to commit leads to short-selling or borrowing
constraints only prevent households from borrowing against future revenue. In this model,
insurance is always possible but its degree can potentially be limited.
This is the main difference with our approach: in our case, lack of insurance is not along
the intensive margin but along the extensive one: either some assets are simply not available
or agents prefer not to pay the fixed cost to access insurance instruments. In that regard, our
approach is closer to Aiyagari (1994).
This difference has important consequences, at least in comparison with the one-sided lack
commitment model. Indeed, this model (see Thomas and Worrall (1988) as an example) fails
to reproduce lack of downward insurance: short-selling or borrowing constraints only prevent
households from borrowing against future revenue and not from accumulating assets for insuring
against lower future income.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the endogenous partial-insurance equilibrium that characterizes an
economy with participation cost in state-contingent asset markets. In this setting households’
degree of insurance depends on their wealth. In fact, when preferences feature decreasing abso-
lute risk aversion, the partial-insurance equilibrium is characterized by a set of poor households
that are not able to obtain any insurance, by a set of middle-class household that actively par-
ticipate in the contingent asset market and, hence, are relatively well insured, and, interestingly,
by a set of rich households that prefer to self insure by accumulating a large stock of the risk-free
assets.
After characterizing the endogenous partial insurance equilibrium from a theoretical point of
view, we explore its quantitative implications. We show that in presence of participation costs
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such that the equilibrium features partial insurance, our model leads to important implications
about wealth inequality, wealth concentration, asset prices, and consumption smoothing. Specif-
ically, when participation costs reduce from an arbitrary large value, such that the economy is
equivalent to an Aiyagari (1994) model, to lower values, such that the economy turns into a
partial-insurance equilibrium, wealth inequality increases and interest rates rise as a result of
a overall lower demand for assets. There are two main channels that rationalize our findings.
First, with endogenous partial insurance middle-class households acquire insurance and, there-
fore, do not have incentive to accumulate a lot of assets; on the contrary, richest households
do not participate in the state contingent asset market and have then a motive to accumulate
asset. This participation channel contributes to the thickening of the upper tail of the wealth
distribution. Second, a general equilibrium effect, labelled interest rate channel and for which
higher insurance participation leads to lower asset demand and higher interest rate, reinforces
the skewness of the wealth distribution. The higher interest rate penalizes non-insured poor
households, which mainly face upward risk and have incentive to dissave, while it benefits richer
agents as they can enjoy higher returns from their financial wealth.
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A Proofs of propositions - Not for publication
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Proof of 1. Assume bN = W−y
2
. The left hand side of equation (3) becomes: u′
(
W+y
2
)
. The right hand
side becomes: pu′
(
W+y
2
− L)+(1−p)u′ (W+y
2
+ pL
1−p
)
. If L = 0 the right hand side is equal to u′
(
W+y
2
)
and the
equation is satisfied. If L > 0, then the right hand side is equal to E0u′
(
W+y
2
)
. By assumption, since u′′′(·) > 0,
the marginal utility is convex, and, therefore, u′(W+y
2
) < E0u′
(
W+y
2
)
. Hence, bN = W−y
2
is not a solution of
(3) when L > 0. Now, since the left hand side of (3) is monotonically increasing in b, and the right hand side
is monotonically decreasing in b, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists bN > W−y
2
that satisfies (3).
Since u′′′(·) > 0 it is trivial to prove the only if direction of the statement. Taking the limit of the right hand
side of (3) for W going to infinity, we have:
lim
W→∞
pu′(y − L+ bN (W )) + (1− p)u′
(
y +
pL
1− p + b
N (W )
)
= lim
W→∞
pu′(bN (W )) + (1− p)u′
(
bN (W )
)
= lim
W→∞
u′(bN (W )),
since y, L, and p are all constant and bN (W ) is increasing in W . Then, by equation (3):
lim
W→∞
u′(W − bN (W )) = lim
W→∞
u′(bN (W )),
which implies
lim
W→∞
bN (W ) =
W
2
=∞.
Proof of 2. Compute ∂b
N (W )
∂W
by applying the implicit function theorem on equation (3). We obtain
∂bN (W )
∂W
= − u
′′(W − bN )
−u′′(W − bN )− pu′′(y − L+ bN )− (1− p)u′′
(
y + pL
1−p + b
N
) . (11)
By assumption of concavity of the utility function, u′′(·) < 0 and ∂bN (W )
∂W
> 0. Finally, notice that when L = 0,
bN = W−y
2
, by part 1, and consequently W − bN = y + bN . In this case ∂bN (W )
∂W
= − u′′(W−bN )−2u′′(W−bN ) = 12 .
In the proof of part 1, we have shown that: lim
W→∞
bN (W ) = W
2
. It follows directly that lim
W→∞
∂bN (W )
∂W
= 1
2
.
Hence, we have that ∀W ≥W , 0 < ∂bN (W )
∂W
≤ 1
2
.
Proof of 3. Assuming L > 0, then we have the following case:
(a) If the utility is CARA, then by definition u′′(W ) = −zu′(W ). Substituting this equivalence for each term
in equation (11) and considering that in equilibrium (3) must hold, the derivative of interest becomes:
∂bN (W )
∂W
= −−zu
′(W − bN )
2zu′(W − bN ) =
1
2
.
(b) Since ∂b
N (W )
∂W
is increasing and tends to 1
2
for W going to infinity, it follows that ∀W ≥W , ∂bN (W )
∂W
< 1
2
.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Proof of 1. The gain of insurance with no costs is: G(W, 0) = u
(
W+y
2
)− 1
2
u(W−bN )− 1
2
[
pu
(
y + bN − L)+ (1− p)u(y + bN + pL
1−p
)]
.
By concavity of utility function,[
pu
(
y + bN − L
)
+ (1− p)u
(
y + bN +
pL
1− p
)]
< u(y + bN ),
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which implies G(W, 0) > u
(
W+y
2
) − 1
2
u(W − bN ) − 1
2
u(y + bN ). Since for any feasible W , by Proposition 1,
bN > W−y
2
,
G(W, 0) > u
(
W + y
2
)
− 1
2
u(W − bN )− 1
2
u(y + bN ) > u
(
W + y
2
)
− 1
2
u
(
W + y
2
)
− 1
2
u
(
W + y
2
)
.
Hence, G(W, 0) > 0, for any feasible W .
Proof of (2). Computing derivative ∂G(W,0)
∂W
and using the envelope theorem, we obtain:
∂G(W, 0)
∂W
=
1
2
u′
(
W + y
2
)
− 1
2
u′(W − bN ).
Using Proposition 1, bN > W−y
2
and W − bN < W+y
2
. Since by assumption u′(·) is decreasing, ∂G(W,0)
∂W
< 0.
Proof of 3. Rewrite
G(W, 0) =
1
2
[
u
(
W + y
2
)
− u(W − bN )
]
+
1
2
[
u
(
W + y
2
)
− u
(
y + bN +
pL
1− p
)]
+
+
p
2
[
u
(
y + bN +
pL
1− p
)
− u(y + bN − L)
]
.
Recall that concavity of u(·) implies that u(x) − u(x0) < u′(x0)(x − x0). Then, bounding above the terms in
square brackets we have:
G(W, 0) <
1
2
u′(W − bN )
[
−W − y
2
+ bN
]
+
1
2
u′
(
y + bN +
pL
1− p
)[
W − y
2
− pL
1− p − b
N
]
+
+
p
2
u′(y + bN − L)
[
L
1− p
]
.
Using (3) to replace u′(W − bN ) and collecting terms, we obtain:
G(W, 0) <
p
2
[
W − y
2
− bN − L
1− p
] [
u′
(
y +
pL
1− p + b
N
)
− u′
(
y − L+ bN
)]
<
p
2
[
bN − bN − L
1− p
] [
u′
(
y +
pL
1− p + b
N
)
− u′
(
y − L+ bN
)]
,
where in the last inequality we made use of the result in Proposition 1 stating that W−y
2
< bN . Hence,
G(W, 0) <
p
2
[
− L
1− p
] [
u′
(
y +
pL
1− p + b
N
)
− u′
(
y − L+ bN
)]
.
By Inada conditions, lim
x→∞
u′(x) = 0 and since, by Proposition 1 lim
W→∞
bN (W ) =∞, then lim
W→∞
G(W, 0) = 0
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. The proof of (1) follows three steps. First, we prove that the function G(W,κ) has one and only one
minimum at a wealth level W ∗. Second, we prove that G(W ∗, κ) < 0. Third, we prove that under the condition
for the participation cost κ < κˆ, there exists a unique threshold level W .
Differentiating definition (4) with respect to W and using the envelope theorem, we obtain:
∂G(W,κ)
∂W
=
1
2
u′
(
W + y
2
− κ
2
)
− 1
2
u′(W − bN )
For a wealth level W ∗(κ) such that bN (W ∗(κ)) = W−y
2
+ κ
2
, we have ∂G(W
∗(κ),κ)
∂W
= 0. Since the utility features
DARA, then bN (W ) is monotonically increasing, as shown in Proposition 1; then W ∗(κ) is unique, if it exists.
Its existence will be proven in the third step.
To show that the point W ∗(κ) is a global minimum for the function G(W,κ), notice that the term
(
W+y
2
− κ
2
)
grows with W at the rate 1
2
, while the term W − bN grows at the rate
(
1− ∂bN (W )
∂W
)
> 1
2
, since the utility
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function is DARA. Hence, since u′(·) is decreasing by assumption, for any W < W ∗(κ), ∂G(W,κ)
∂W
< 0, and for any
W > W ∗(κ), ∂G(W,κ)
∂W
> 0. Therefore, the function G(W,κ) attains a minimum at W ∗(κ).
Next, notice that with a similar proof than part 3 of Proposition 2, it holds that lim
W→∞
G(W,κ) = 0. It
follows that since G(W,κ) admits exactly one minimum, W ∗(κ), since it is decreasing for any W < W ∗(κ), it is
increasing for any W > W ∗(κ), and it converges to 0 when W goes it ∞, then necessarily G(W ∗(κ), κ) < 0. We
have proved that the minimum of G(W,κ) is negative and that for any W > W ∗(κ), G(W,κ) < 0.
As a third step, let κˆ be the value of the cost that solves: G(W, κˆ) = 0. Recall that, by Proposition
2, G(W, 0) > 0. Also, notice that for G
(
W, 2
[
bN (W )− W−y
2
])
< 0, by the condition above. Hence since
G(W,κ) is monotonically decreasing in κ, by the intermediate value theorem, ∃! κˆ ∈
(
0, 2
[
bN (W )− W−y
2
]
)
)
:
G(W, κˆ) = 0. Then, for any κ such that κ < κˆ, then G(W,κ) > 0 and G(W,κ) reach a negative value at its
minimum, W*, which necessarily exists; hence, by the intermediate value theorem, exists a unique W (κ) < W ∗(κ)
such that G(W (κ), κ) = 0.
The proof of (2) comes easily. First, by Proposition 2, for any feasible W , G(W, 0) > 0. Hence, ∀W > W ,
V P (W,κ) > V N (W ) and by definition P(0) = {W : W > W}.
Second, recall that W ∗ is determined by the condition: u′
(
W∗(κ)+y
2
− κ
2
)
− u′(W ∗(κ) − bN (W ∗(κ))) = 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem and the fact that W
∗(κ)+y
2
− κ
2
= W ∗(κ)− bN (W ∗(κ)) and that ∂bN
∂W
≤ 1
2
,
we obtain ∂W
∗(κ)
∂κ
< 0. In addition, since also G(W,κ) is decreasing in κ, it must be that ∂W (κ
∂κ
< 0. Therefore,
∀κ2 > κ1, P(κ2) ⊂ P(κ1).
Finally, as κ increases above κˆ, G(W,κ) < 0, and, therefore, ∀W > W , G(W,κ) < 0, since the function
G(W,κ) starts at negative value, decreases to W ∗, and than converges to zero from below from W going to
infinity. In this case ∀W > W , V P (W,κ) < V N (W ) and by definition P(κ) = ∅.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.
The proof consists of four steps.
In the fist step the key idea is transform our problem in a standard optimal saving/income fluctuation problem
with an augmented income process. Consider the budget constraint:
c+ qfB′ + δ
 ∑
y′∈A(y)
q(y′|y)ᵀa′(y′) + κ
 = wy +B + a.
It can be rewritten as
c+ qfB′ = y˜(δ, y, a′(y′)) +B(y), (12)
where we have defined the augmented income process y˜ as:
y˜(δ, y, a′(y′)) = wy − δ
 ∑
y′∈A(y)
q(y′|y)ᵀa′(y′) + κ
+ a.
We interpret the function y˜(·) as an augmented income process, which is function of the exogenous income current
realization, y, the participation decision, δ, and of the quantity of state contingent assets purchased, a′(y′). The
latter two variables are clearly endogenous decisions, but one can think that these decisions, together with future
realization of nature, map present augmented income into next period augmented income. Notice that conditional
on participation and asset holding decision, which are chosen at time t, the augmented income process is a Markov
process. In the rest of the proof we just refer to the augmented income process as y˜, since it is understood that
it is a function of endogenous variables.
The second step is to show the following lemma;
Lemma 8. For any participation decision δ, when contingent asset holdings are bounded, the domain of y˜, which
we define as Y˜ , is finite.
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Proof. Assume δ = 0. Then y˜ = wy + a. In this case y˜ is finite when a is finite.
Now assume δ = 1, the highest value for the augmented income, which we denote by N˜ , is
y˜N˜ = wyN + a−
 ∑
y′∈A(yN ):
q(y′|yN )ᵀa¯+ κ
 .
Intuitively, the augmented income is bounded above by the fact that asset holding is bounded below by a¯.
Similarly, for the worst income realization y1, we have:
wy1 −
 ∑
y′∈A(y1)
q(y′|y1)ᵀa′(y′) + κ
+ a
which is bounded when a remains bounded.
Hence, given the states, the household budget constraint can be rewritten as in (12), in which the augmented
income state is finite, for any possible participation decision and asset holding decision. Therefore, as third step,
we can apply directly Proposition 4 in Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018), which proves that the state space for the risk free asset B
can be written as a compact state, so that exist a finite B¯ > 0 such that B′(B, a, y) < B¯ for all y˜ ∈ Y˜ , and for
all B > B¯. Therefore, the following lemma follows directly from our definition of the augmented income process
and from Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018)’s results.
Lemma 9. If a is bounded, then B is bounded as well.
The last step is to show that a cannot be unbounded. For this step it is useful to show the following
preliminary result:
Lemma 10. If a is unbounded, then B is unbounded as well.
Proof. Let us show this by contradiction. Notice that state contingent asset position is bounded below by a¯ by
assumption. We can bound above the highest possible value for one state contingent asset. Consider an asset that
repays only if tomorrow income state is y′ = yj . The possible highest labor income is yN . The non-negativeness
of consumption implies that:
wyN − q(yj |yN )a′(yj)−
 ∑
y′ 6=yj∈A(yN )
q(y′|yN )ᵀa¯
− κ+ a− qf B¯ +B ≥ 0,
which implies that:
a′(yj) ≤
wyN −
(∑
y′ 6=yj∈A(yN ) q(y
′|yN )ᵀa¯
)
− κ+ a− qf B¯ +B
q(yj |yN )
Hence, all the state contingent asset are bounded below and above when B is bounded.
Finally it is easy to show that a cannot be indeed unbounded. In fact, if B were unbounded, given the
assumptions on preferences and for any positive κ, there would exist a level of B for which agents are better off
not participating and thus a = 0 for any of these points. Thus, a cannot be unbounded.
Then the state space for a is bounded and close; therefore, by the Heine-Borel Theorem, it is compact. The
same is then obtain from Lemma 9 for B.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5.
Using Proposition 4, we can restrict our focus on a compact set for assets. As the set of income is also
compact and given that V is a continuous function of all these variables, the relevant set of payoffs for the value
function is bounded. Thus, we can use standard results for bounded utility functions and the proposition below
establishes the existence and the uniqueness of the value function solving Problem 2.
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Proposition 11. The value function V exists and is unique.
Moreover, the value function V can be obtained by iterations: for any initial value V ′ ∈ Ω and defining the
sequence, Vn = T
nV ′, Vn converges to V .
Proof. This proof extends the proof of Stokey et al. (1989) for discrete variables. It is useful to write the problem
in 2 in a more compact way, that is:
V (B, {a(y)}, y) = max
{a′(y′)}y′∈A(y),B′,δ
u (c) + β∑
y′
pi(y′|y)V (B′, {a′(y′)}, y′)

s.t. c+ δ
 ∑
y′∈A(y)
q(y′|y)ᵀa′(y′) + κ
+ qfB′ ≤ wy +B + a(y),
B′ ≥ −B; a′(y′) ≥ a¯ ∀y′ ∈ A(y).
For simplicity, we will refer to the the constraints as cnstr. Defining T as:
TV = max
{a′(y′)}y′∈A(y),B′,δ s.t. cnstr
u (c) + β∑
y′
pi(y′|y)V (B′, {a′(y′)}, y′)

it is easy to show that T satisfies Blackwell’s conditions. First T is monotonic. For W ≤ V , we have that :
TW = max
{a′(y′)}y′∈A(y),B′,δ s.t. cnstr
u (c) + β∑
y′
pi(y′|y)W (B′, {a′(y′)}, y′)

≤ max
{a′(y′)}y′∈A(y),B′,δ s.t. cnstr
u (c) + β∑
y′
pi(y′|y)V (B′, {a′(y′)}, y′)

= TV
Second T discounts. Let Γ be a positive constant:
T (V + Γ) = max
{a′(y′)}y′∈A(y),B′,δ s.t. cnstr
u (c) + β∑
y′
pi(y′|y) (V (B′, {a′(y′)}, y′) + Γ)

= max
{a′(y′)}y′∈A(y),B′,δ s.t. cnstr
u (c) + β
Γ +∑
y′
V (B′, {a′(y′)}, y′)

= TV + βΓ
We define X = {x = {B′, a′(y′), y′}}. Ω denotes the set of functions V such that V is continuous with respect to
B and a(y). We need also to prove that:
• Ω with the d∞ metric is a metric space.
• TV is in the same set as V , which is obvious.
Metric space Let {Vn} a Cauchy sequence of Ω. For every x ∈ X, Vn(x) converges to V (x). Let us verify
that V is the limit using the d∞ metric. As {Vn} a Cauchy sequence: for some  > 0 and for some x ∈ X, there
exists n such that for every p and q satisfying q ≥ p > n, |Vp(x), Vq(x)| < . Taking the limit of this expression
with respect to q, we obtain that |Vp(x), V (x)| < . As this is true for every x ∈ X, this implies that d∞(Vp, V )
converges to 0, which means that Vn converges to V .
Conclusion The requirements of the Contraction Mapping theorem are satisfied. There exists an unique
V ∈ Ω such that TV = V . Furthermore, for any V ′ ∈ Ω and defining V1 = TV ′ and, more generally, Vn = TnV ′,
Vn converges to V . This makes possible iterations on the value function as usual.
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The connexion between being solution to Problem 1 and to Problem 2 easily obtains from standard results, at
least in the case of bounded utility function (see Stokey et al., 1989). Indeed, in that case, the discrete participation
choice does not prevent limn→∞
∑n
t=0 β
tu(ct) to exist (and be finite), which allows to use Theorems 4.2 to 4.5
in chapter 4, thus guaranteeing the equality between the two solutions.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7.
The first step of the proof is to show that we can use results from Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018) with the augmented income
process as in the proof of Proposition 4. Assumptions 1, 2, 3 guarantee that the assumptions on utility and
prices Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018) are satisfied. In addition, given our assumed production function in equation 5 guarantees
that Assumption 5 in Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018) is also satisfied. We now show that the augmented process y˜, defined in ,
satisfies the following lemma:
Lemma 12. Assume that pi(y1|y1) > 0, which means that the lowest income state has some persistent. Then,
pi(y˜1|y˜1) > 0, that is the lowest state of the augmented income process is also persistent.
Proof. Recall that the augmented income process is:
y˜ = wy − δ
∑
y′
∈ A(y)q(y′|y)ᵀa′(y′) + κ
+ a.
Assume the current income is at the lowest state, i.e. y = y1. if δ−1 = 0 and δ = 0, which means no participation
in the previous and current period, than y˜1 = wy1 and, by assumption, pi(y˜1|y˜1) > 0. Now consider the case in
which the previous period there was no participation, δ−1 = 0, and the agent optimally participates in the current
period, δ = 1. In this case, the the augmented income process is: y˜ = wy1 −
(∑
y′ ∈ A(y)q(y′|y)ᵀa′(y′) + κ
)
.
The agent has only upside risk and therefore, to smooth consumption she will borrow today to repay debt in
the next period that means that y˜ > wy1 in this case. However, since the lowest income state is persistent,
there is a sequence of unlucky events for which for several periods the agent will remain in the lowest state,
for which he won’t get repayment. Notice that this is the only optimal behaviour to smooth consumption, as
repayment in the future lowest state, means saving in the current lowest state. In the presence of upside risk and
non-zero probability to have higher income, it would contrast with consumption smoothing incentives driven by
the concavity of the utility function. If the agent keeps participating and keeps receiving the lowest income his
wealth will run down, since in each period the agent has to pay the participation cost. Therefore, eventually the
agent either will stop participating, and we go back to the previous case, or he become borrowing constraint at
B¯ and, if it is optimal to participate in that case, a sequence of low income realization will lead to a constant
asset participation decision and therefore to a constant y˜1. Even in this case, y˜1 is persistent. These two case
are the only relevant cases, since, it is trivial to show that in a sequence of low income realization, when running
down assets, either the agent consistently participates or consistently does not participate, once she has reached
the borrowing limit.
A first conclusion is that when the conditions of Lemma 12 are satisfied, qf > β, following Proposition 6 in
Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018).
Furthermore, given that net purchases of contingent assets are invested in capital and that capital is supply
competitively, we have that, for any y ∈ Y and for any y′ ∈ A(y), q(y′|y) = qfpi(y′|y). More specifically, the
program of firms is:
max
AtKαt L1−αt − wtLt −∑
y∈Y
∑
y′∈A(y)
pi(y′|y)
∑
{a,B}∈A
a′(y′|(y, a,B))−
∑
y∈Y
∑
{a,B}∈A
B′(y, a,B)

where a′(y′|(y, a,B)) is the amount of contingent asset to state y′ purchased when current state variables
{y, a,B} ∈ S.
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The resulting first order conditions are:
wt = (1− α)At
(
Kt
Lt
)α
,
qfαAt
(
Kt
Lt
)α−1
= 1,
q(y′|y)αAt
(
Kt
Lt
)α−1
= pi(y′|y), for all y ∈ Y and all y′ ∈ A(y).
In particular, we obtain that q(y′|y) = qfpi(y′|y).
Existence of an equilibrium With this definition in hands, we can obtain the following lemma, based
on results in the literature:
Lemma 13. Given an insurance decision δ : S → {0, 1} and a′ : S →Rdim(A), there exists a stationary recursive
competitive equilibrium conditional on a insurance decision.
Proof. Because: (i) the assumed utility function is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave;
(ii) it satisfies Assumption 1 and Assumption 2; (iii) the assumed production function in equation (5) is Cobb-
Douglas, and (iv) Lemma 12 holds; then, all the assumptions for Theorem 1 in Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018) are satisfied, and,
therefore, there exists a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium conditional on insurance decision.
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